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NEW TIMES

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NEW TIMES

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TOWARDS THE NORTH POLE...

...AND COOPERATION

Today's features:

A breakthrough in understanding.
The authors of a Soviet-American book call on the New Times offices.
(See p. 12.)

Newsmen meet in Andorra: An unusual experiment.
(See p. 26.)

Our special correspondent on the Soviet-Canadian skiing expedition to the North Pole. (See p. 32.)

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

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

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Photo by V. Pchelkin

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To our readers

First of all we publish two dissatisfied letters to the magazine.

TIMOFEI BOGOMOLOV
Omsk, U.S.S.R.

■ Your magazine is described as a weekly of world affairs. But does this mean that all articles should deal with foreign policy issues only? I think you devote too little attention to domestic affairs. It is very likely that foreign readers are also very interested in the perestroika now under way in our country.

A. SMIRNOV
Gatchina, Leningrad Region, U.S.S.R.

■ Why has the rubric Taking Up a Point disappeared from your magazine? One would think that in an atmosphere of glasnost more rubrics of this kind, with frank articles on acute issues, should appear in New Times. Perhaps you are not receiving letters with questions of interest to readers. Or perhaps you are complacent, believing that the magazine covers all issues of our life.

The magazine has received other critical letters, so we must have it out with our readers.

We hope our long-standing readers have noticed the changes that have taken place in the magazine over the past few months, in particular in the coverage of domestic affairs, about which Timofei Bogomolov from Omsk writes. We have started giving wider coverage to domestic affairs this year.

It will easily be guessed that this was necessitated by perestroika, in which both Soviet and foreign readers are equally interested. Moreover, the public worldwide is closely watching the changes in our country, fully aware that they will also have an all-round influence on global processes and, consequently, on the future of mankind as a whole. The internal processes under way in the Soviet Union dialectically influence, as strongly as never before, its foreign policy course, its efforts to build civilized relations in our world.

At the same time, greater coverage of domestic affairs means perestroika in our editorial office and our work. In some recent issues nearly half the space was devoted to internal problems. This called for an appropriate reorganization of our editorial staff and for proper standards in the elaboration of these problems. This also requires a certain effort.

We see it as our task to give innovative views of this or that issue of perestroika or democratization in our society. Authoritative and original authors are needed not only for this rubric but also for Observer's View, Reflections, Polemics, The Past and the Present, and other rubrics. We are going to continue these rubrics in the spirit of a free competition of brains, socialist pluralism of opinions, complete glasnost and comparisons of alternative approaches.

And herein lies the essence of our address to readers. In the present circumstances no newspaper or magazine can exist without the interested participation of readers. The stage is dead without an audience. We journalists call the reader our correspondent No. 1. This is not because we want to curry favour with him. It is readers who feed the editorial staff with new themes, addresses and unofficial information.

The author of the second letter, A. Smirnov from Leningrad Region, suspects us of complacency. True, he writes in a spirit of inquiry, thereby giving us a chance to defend ourselves. There can be no talk of complacency, of course. On the contrary, we hope for more active and constructive participation by our readers in the magazine and its articles. Indeed, the rubric Taking Up a Point has disappeared. But the real dialogue with our readers has been broadened. Each issue of New Times opens with a collection of letters under the general heading of Glasnost. We receive these letters from all over the world, and the possibilities of this section are therefore boundless. We invite our readers to be full masters of it.

We also value your ideas and views of different events and phenomena. The rubric Glasnost and others in the magazine provide a good opportunity for constant dialogue, and we invite all of you to the rostrum.

GLASNOST

FROM OUR MAILBAG

READERS' COMMENT ON THE PRESS AND TV

JOAQUIN GRANE MUNNE,
Castelldefels, Spain

■ I've learned recently that while watching TV bridges with capitalist countries, Soviet viewers see TV commercials on their screens; this news upset me greatly—after all, you may think that the paradise you are shown is our actual way of life. Our TV station owners will certainly not show you the harsh reality in which the glitter of what is called the Western world camouflages poverty, famine, social inequality, and some other "blessings" not worth enumerating here.

I think it would be only fair to show these TV commercials in combination with scenes of what really lurks behind our "affluence." I am quite sure that Soviet television will be able to show the nations and ethnic groups inhabiting your country that in the Western world all that glitters is not gold, and that glasnost and perestroika will make it possible to give the Soviet people an objective view of the Western world.

ILYA TISHCHENKO
Novorossiisk, U.S.S.R.

■ While watching television recently, I heard a woman answer the question "What does perestroika mean to you?" as follows: "I now read five times more than before—newspapers and magazines, as well as books." This is very true of most of us. We have developed the urge to open a newspaper every morning (having queued for it at a newsstand), and leaf through a fresh issue of a magazine. There is hardly a single pe-

GLASNOST

FROM OUR MAILBAG

As the magazine has begun to give broader though not entirely satisfying coverage to domestic affairs, it has itself entered a new stage, and this explains why we need the collective experience of our readers. Let us assimilate this experience together to guarantee a revolutionary change in our internal life and the accompanying international climate.

Democracy and glasnost are not merely slogans of the day but an effective instrument in the struggle for a new quality of life. Let us use this instrument and jointly clear the way for new thinking and new processes. The way should first be cleared for them around us. We journalists will publicize your efforts in the press.

Perestroika and new thinking have played a universally recognized part in changing the international situation. Hence the direct connection between our efforts in perestroika and the shaping of a new macroclimate in the contemporary world. That is why collective wisdom, the open elaboration of foreign policy decisions and moves, are so necessary here. The voice of citizen diplomacy—the active participation of men and women of good will, in both word and deed, in the building of a cloudless future for the present and coming generations—is being heard more and more loudly in the world, especially in our country.

That is why we also address our readers abroad. We expect of them a more effective contribution to New Times. Your understanding, your views of the processes taking place in our society, as well as your views of world events and the situation in your own countries, are no less important to us than the opinions of our citizens.

Today people understand increasingly that universal values and orientations have priority over the ideals advocated by one or other political system. Let these ideals compete in winning minds and hearts for a better organization of their life. The principal condition for life is a peaceful sky over our trouble-weary planet.

Meetings between our compatriots and foreign opponents or like-minded persons in the pages of newspapers and magazines, including New Times, is an effective means of mutual understanding and hence joint action. We would like our readers in socialist countries to take a more active part in the processes of democratization and glasnost. They are also going through a significant and complex period in their lives, searching for ways of renewal, activization of the human factor, the maximum possible use of the advantages of our social system. It is high time we compared this invaluable experience and made use of it for the benefit of each country and all countries together.

Today each individual and his opinion are respected. But it is also a time of collective thought and action. The more intelligent individuals rally in support of revolutionary perestroika and new thinking in international relations, the more safe and comfortable our world and its future will be. Let us work together to attain this most humane goal.

We look forward to your letters.

THE EDITORS

riodical that has not changed for the better of late.

I still have the impression that the papers, radio and television are not telling us the whole story and are holding a great deal back. I can't prove this, of course, but the feeling haunts me all the same. You see, most of us have lost our faith in the printed word, and it will probably be a long time before we learn to trust it again.

ANDREJ FOZIKOS
Prague, Czechoslovakia

I am writing this after having read the interview with Juskevicius, Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. State Committee on Radio and Television (No. 11, 1988). To begin with, I must admit that I am no expert, and my reasoning may sound irrelevant to some. Instead of increasing the number of TV programmes and lengthening TV time, I suggest that the latter be restricted to a reasonable limit. What's more, it would be not a bad idea to do without television for one day a week.

I am far from denying the usefulness of television. I am not as conservative as that. But let's face it, television creates a lot of problems, too. I mean its effect on child raising, for instance. I have brought up two children myself, and I remember how much effort I've had to make to cure them of the symptoms of TV mania. I'm sure doctors and psychologists will agree with me that such an illness does exist. It affects adults as well as children. We turn on the "box" and forget all about other interesting pastimes. And another thing. The TV programme guides published in advance leave parents uncertain as to which programmes a child can view, and which it ought not to. As a result, the age limit below which certain programmes are not recommended is gradually going down. On the other hand, our film and TV feature makers are becoming increasingly democratic, more permissive and increasingly naturalistic. As they sow, so society reaps.

And what about the educational function of television, some may ask. It is of crucial importance, I agree but I wouldn't absolutize it. Specialized academic and language programmes apart, television furnishes superficial information. Moreover, it creates the dangerous illusion that learning is easy, and breaks one of the habit of studying in the usual way, which gives far better results. Even the classics are known to our children mostly not from books, but from film adaptations they have seen on television.

And isn't it odd, moreover, to hear the small screen urge us to take up sport while stealing, with its sports programmes, billions of hours which could have been spent taking exercise?

I realize that many will disagree with what I am saying. People have already got used to television, which is as habit-forming as a drug. They ought to be cured of the habit carefully, delicately even. But cheap entertainment programmes catering to primitive tastes must be resolutely discarded right away.

GLASNOST

From our mailbag

A MATTER AT ISSUE

VASILY KHOSHABAYEV
Artashat District,
Armenian S.S.R.

■ As an Assyrian, I belong to one of the Soviet Union's smallest ethnic groups. Once my people lived in Mesopotamia, a mighty power which made a great contribution to the progress of world culture.

Now, I wonder what would have happened if our socialist society had not been based on the principles of Leninist nationalities policy? Today we have a chance to study in Russian, but, at the same time, we can do so in our native tongue—this is our inalienable right. Our national traditions, culture and ancestral customs are lovingly preserved. Many of us Assyrians have specialized secondary and higher education and work alongside Russians, Armenians, Georgians and people of other nationalities. I must say that neither any member of my family nor myself are discriminated against or Russified.

I am proud of my nationality. But what will happen if its name is withdrawn from our passports? Won't mine and other ethnic minorities who have neither a republic, autonomy, or even a territory of their own, cease to exist?

Ours is a society that is socialist in content and internationalist in form. And I think it only right that our passports, and those of our children and grandchildren, specify not only their Soviet citizenship, but their nationality as well.

E. VAULINA
Rostov-on-Don, U.S.S.R.

■ The problem of nationality has long been on my mind. Personally, I would prefer it if our passports did not specify the bearers' nationality because I am of mixed origin, a product of multiple intermarriages for generations, and I might as well call myself any of the at least four nationalities my ancestors belonged to. Who can tell what my true nationality is? Can your reader V. Kuchma of Dneprodzerzhinsk (whose letter you carried in your No. 6/88) help me solve this problem once and for all?

I respect his national feelings, but strongly object to his opinionated stand on this delicate and complex matter.

To my mind, you can't demand that everyone, indiscriminately, should fill in the space marked "nationality." The personal preference of each individual ought certainly to be taken into consideration. For me, "nationality" has long become a formality in every sense because this attribute has no real meaning. So does it pay to practise formalism?

Pros and cons

F. OZERSKY
Vologda, U.S.S.R.

The arguments of your Italian reader who is opposed to the "historical" aspect of our perestroika do not differ much from those of our own "diehards." As a matter of fact, the arguments are so similar that I wouldn't be surprised to learn that the fancy Italian name has been assumed by one of our compatriots. Incidentally, the gentleman from San Remo will find the answers to all his questions in the article "What kind of socialism are they mourning" by Professor A. Butenko in the same issue. Analyzing Nina Andreyeva's article in Sovetskaya Rossia, the Professor justly describes it as a political declaration by the advocates of a bureaucratic demagogical "socialism," Stalin-style, a "socialism" devoid of elementary democracy. Ironically, both your Italian reader and our own "men of principle" call themselves advocates of perestroika. This is most dangerous because it is much easier to fight an avowed enemy than one in disguise.

NADEZHDA NARUBINA
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

I quite agree with Gerhard Roth that people should know the whole truth, and understand what actually happened. I am convinced that if not for the heinous crimes committed by Stalin, the Great Patriotic War wouldn't have taken such a heavy toll of lives, and there wouldn't have been the period in our history now referred to as "stagnation."

But here is another point I'd like to make. Don't our papers now give too much space to the personality cult? I have the impression that jourunalists have begun to cash in on this subject, which is so sensitive to us all. There is no denying the need to write the truth, but why not bring all these articles together, systematize them, publish them in book form, set out all the facts objectively and in detail—and leave it at that?

ROMAN IVANITSKY,
Student,
Lvov, U.S.S.R.

It must be an inanlienable right of everyone to speak his mind and criticize anyone without respect for persons. For years we were deprived of this right. I recall the following episode from A. Bek's book, "New Assignment": the main character is present at a conversation between Ordzhonikidze and Stalin, and finds himself compelled to give a false answer to Stalin's questions. He acted against his conscience out of fear.

This kind of behaviour has become the norm for most people. They have no scruples about it, although lying has a corrosive effect on society and youth in particular.

AN ARTIST'S COMMENT

Drawing
by A. Orekhov

PRIVATE OPINION

HIGHLIGHT OF THE WEEK



RAJESWARA RAO, General Secretary, National Council, Communist Party of India

The conclusion of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan is exerting, and will exert in the near future, a perceptible influence on the situation in the Southwest Asian region and the world as a whole. The agreements are a product of new political thinking and bold initiatives on the part of the Soviet and Afghan leadership, and make it possible to settle a very painful regional conflict.

Concluding them was a major step forward in carrying out the proposals advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok to ensure peace, security and cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region.

I would like to hope that Pakistan and the United States will strictly follow the letter and spirit of the agreements on Afghanistan and stop aid to the counter-revolutionary forces who are impeding the restoration of peace and stability there. In our opinion, the threat to the Afghan people comes from just these forces.

As an Indian, I note with satisfaction the positive role my country has played in the process of reaching an Afghan settlement, I think the government of the Republic of Afghanistan will continue to get the necessary moral and material support from the government of India. In this connection Indian Communists welcome the forthcoming visit of President Najibullah to their country.

Crocker Snow, Editor-in-Chief of Worldpaper, Boston, U.S.A.

Our journal recently conducted an international conference on the subject "Global information: the invisible revolution reshaping our world," at which a representative of New Times was present.

For the first time in human history, information and money is crossing borders quicker than people and products.

The Chernobyl disaster of April 1986 and the black Monday on stock markets around the world of October 19, 1987 are dramatic examples of this phenomenon, and of some of its most disturbing side effects.

The news of the Chernobyl accident spread far faster around the world and had a more devastating impact on the public than the radioactive fallout that spread westwards and northwards over Europe. In the final analysis, the psychological fallout exceeded the physical.

In 1964 the Canadian thinker Marshall McLuhan said "the medium is the message" in the age of the global village. Sadly, this is true, but it is not the whole truth in the age of global information exchange.

In our day, better mutual understanding is hampered not by the failure to understand what is said, but by the inability properly to comprehend it.

Mikhail Shatrov, playwright, U.S.S.R.

Moscow was recently the venue for a scientific conference of historians and writers on "Perestroika: a way of thinking and acting." History and historical literature must tackle one and the same task in their own way. They must help man acquire historical self-awareness, evolve convictions, and become stronger. In our country there is an absolute imbalance in this respect. Historical science has achieved successes, and good books have been published. But there are no books on history of Soviet society and the Communist Party that can satisfy present-day demands.

Of all the sciences, history suffered most in the years of the personality cult. There were no limits to falsification. The process of restoring a truly scientific approach among historians proceeded very slowly after the 20th Party Congress and even after the 27th Congress. People are still unable to believe in themselves. Fear is deeply rooted in them.

Meanwhile, now that people are expressing different views of various aspects of our life, including various periods of history, the party has clearly formulated the principles for a scientific and objective study of its history. It seems, however, that the documents in which these principles were formulated, first of all Mikhail Gorbachev's speech on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October revolution and his report at the February 1988 plenum of the party's Central Committee, have not yet been used widely and have not unfortunately accelerated the publication of profound works by our historians.

The level of our historical literature also leaves much to be desired. The law of communicating vessels operates here: the development of historical literature is directly connected with the progress of historical science. I am especially concerned about the treatment of the image of Lenin. The image of Lenin first appeared in literary works sanctioned by Stalin in 1937. Though it would have been explosive with regard to the real situation, it was serene for a long time, endorsing the existing state of affairs. Whenever works appeared showing Lenin as intolerant of a certain situation, persecutions immediately began. An end must be put to this practice once and for all.

Common sense vs. ambitions

The effort toward a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan has gone through its first stage. The door is now open for the second stage – bringing the situation in the country back to normal.

Pavel Demchenko

It happens fairly frequently in history that before an event has taken place it is assessed in one way, but afterwards it is seen differently, at times even in a diametrically opposite light. That truism leaps to mind today when one leafs through the foreign comments, especially Western ones, on the signing of the Geneva documents designed to bring a political settlement to the situation around Afghanistan.

I remember the sceptical reaction to the indirect Afghan-Pakistani negotiations both when they had just begun six years ago, and in subsequent years when their progress was barely perceptible. Few people believed it to be possible that they would be successfully concluded. So either nothing was reported about the negotiations, or just a few lines tucked away in a corner. That, incidentally, reflected the feeling in Western political circles. "Can you imagine such agreements?" they seemed to ask. "Can you imagine the Russians withdrawing their troops on the basis of voluntarily adopted diplomatic accords," added others.

To be fair, one should say that to a certain extent such a reaction stemmed from the prolonged nature of the Afghan conflict. And could anyone have supposed in April 1978, when the revolution that brought the People's Democratic Party to power took place, or in December 1979, when at Kabul's request a Soviet military contingent arrived in the country, that the situation in Afghanistan and around it would become one of the world's most complex and protracted crises?

My job as a journalist took me to Kabul with the first Soviet units. I remember well the mood at the time and can bear witness to the fact that at the beginning everything looked much simpler than it did a year or two later.

The situation was, of course, serious then too: by the end of 1979 the Afghan leadership had found itself in a difficult and perhaps even critical situation, aware that it was losing control over whole areas of the country, and that it was unable to close the borders across which the flow of weapons and subversive groups was rapidly increasing. That is why it turned for military assistance to the Soviet Union, with which it had signed a treaty on friendship, good-neighbourly relations and cooperation. In the summer and autumn of that year there had been more than a dozen such requests. The decision to give such aid was not immediately forthcoming. But even when it was taken, our leadership at the time probably did not suppose that the military conflict would be so long-drawn-out or tortuous. That makes all the more significant today's success of the new realistic approach to resolving this difficult problem demonstrated by Moscow and Kabul, the approach that has led to the signing of the Geneva package of agreements.

Nor should it be forgotten that the Afghan-Pakistani negotiations began in 1982 in an extremely unfavourable international situation, and on many occasions seemed to have reached a dead end. So at the beginning there was little cause for optimism. But even when a breakthrough had been achieved in Geneva and the documents were almost ready, many people still did not believe in a successful outcome.

I think the ending proved unexpected for American diplomacy as well and, as if realizing that the end was in view, it began making demands which in effect could no longer change anything. Apparently realizing this, Washington changed its tone: U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz even described the Geneva package as a historic event.

The future of the political settlement around Afghanistan now depends on how responsibly, consistently and energetically all the obligations assumed by the signatories are carried through. The Soviet government in its statement of April 26 underlined that the Soviet Union is determined to abide fully by the Geneva agreements, keeping firmly and unhesitatingly to their provisions. There should be no doubt, the statement stresses, that the agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet forces, along with the other obligations assumed by the two sides, are irreversible. The government of Afghanistan has also declared its determination to fulfil its obligations honestly and consistently.

Although the Geneva agreements will come into force only on May 15 and the withdrawal of Soviet troops will begin on that day, there is every reason to state now that the first stage in the struggle for a peaceful settlement in the region has been completed. All that remains is to put it into practice. The Geneva agreements have paved the way for the next stage, the second one – normalizing the situation inside Afghanistan itself. The basis for such a normalization already exists. It was laid by the policy of national reconciliation which the Kabul government has been pursuing for almost eighteen months. And this policy is bearing fruit, although perhaps not quickly enough.

So it is not surprising that the more serious foreign observers are now considering what this second stage will be like and how long it will last. I would divide the views and forecasts into two groups. One group deals with the prospects for the development of the situation inside Afghanistan, and the other with the effect that the Afghan settlement will have on the entire region, on other crisis points worldwide, and on international relations generally.

The Geneva agreements have not of course untied the complex Afghan knot as such. But if they are implemented scrupulously, they will safeguard the country from outside interference and from the consequences of the undeclared war that year after year was drawing the knot tighter and tighter, and will thereby give the Afghans themselves the opportunity, without outside pressure, to settle the question of a government and, in general, the future of the country and its international status.

Many people now predict that as Soviet units begin to leave the country, the fighting will increase and the Afghan authorities will have a tough time. The "Peshawar seven" opposition parties have rejected the Geneva agreements, turned down President Najibullah's offer

to begin talks on setting up a coalition government, and boycotted the recent elections to the Afghan parliament – the National Council. This alliance of seven claims to have the sole right to form a Ministerial Cabinet in Afghanistan. Why? On what grounds? And is it in their power, even if one takes into consideration that it has generous foreign, and especially American, support.

No matter what yardstick you choose, you find that the present leadership of the republic in Afghanistan is the best organized and strongest political force. It has many weighty arguments in its favour: the People's Democratic Party has ten years of experience in governing the country, the government has a well-equipped army, a state apparatus, a flexible policy of national reconciliation envisaging a multi-party political system and a mixed economy. So I believe it to have been no fortuity that so eminent an American expert as Selig Harrison should have expressed "great doubts" in Washington Post of April 19 that the present Afghan government would fall apart once Soviet troops begin to leave the country. Analyzing the situation, he comes to the conclusion that it is the Alliance of Seven that is more likely to fall apart, as it is already being torn asunder by internal strife, and a power struggle between its leaders. The possibility of this becoming a reality will undoubtedly increase after the alliance forces have been obliged to leave Pakistan, as envisaged by the Geneva accords, and move to Afghan territory.

A word about the reaction of Afghanistan's neighbours. China welcomed the Geneva agreements, describing them as "positive." Pakistan's position is common knowledge, since it is a signatory to the accords. India favours a peaceful settlement of the problem and is making a constructive contribution to its solution. The stand taken by Iran, already deeply involved in its war with Iraq, can only cause regret. Teheran has taken a negative stand on the Geneva accords. However, it obviously has little intention of backing Afghan extremists funded by the Americans. But on the territory of Iran there exists an anti-Kabul alliance of eight, albeit not very active, and more than a million Afghan refugees. So that aspect remains so far an unknown quantity.

A military parade in Kabul as part of celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the April national democratic revolution.

That being the situation, it is indeed impossible to rule out the possibility of hostilities flaring up in Afghanistan, especially since Washington is insisting that it will never leave its allies in the lurch and is hastily supplying as many weapons as possible. Nevertheless, no matter how complex the situation, the possibility of a coalition government being formed in Kabul remains a distinct possibility. As one American journalist exclaimed, the Geneva agreements are a miracle, but it will be an even greater miracle if the Kabul authorities come to an agreement with the mujaheddin on setting up a joint government. But such a miracle could occur, he concludes.

The Geneva package unfortunately does not automatically guarantee an end to the civil war in Afghanistan, but it does create the conditions for eliminating one of the most complex regional conflicts, a conflict that has caused great anguish to the Soviet people. The very fact that the documents have been signed by two Asian states – Pakistan and Afghanistan – and two great powers, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., which are more often rivals and opponents in the world arena than partners, speaks volumes. On the one hand, it is the result of the changing political situation in the world, and on the other, it provides a stimulus for widening and deepening East-West dialogue, strengthening mutual trust and developing the trade, economic, scientific, technical and other contacts that have been overshadowed by Afghanistan all these years. The Geneva accords on Afghanistan are on a par in their significance with the Soviet-American treaty on eliminating medium- and shorter-range missiles. In both cases success proved possible because the two sides were ready to take each other's interests into consideration.

At the same time, the Geneva package on Afghanistan also sets an example for the elimination of other regional conflicts, not by means of arms or pressure through strength, but through negotiations, and sensible mutually acceptable compromises, as for example, for the Iran-Iraq and Arab-Israeli conflicts, where so much blood has been shed. There can be no doubt that they too could be resolved if realism and an ability to take each other's interests into account were displayed.

By displaying flexibility and at the same time firmness at the Geneva talks, the Afghan government has clearly enhanced its international prestige. I believe that were the government of Iran to agree to get down to negotiations with Iraq on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 598, the country's political prestige would only be augmented. No matter how difficult the dialogue between the warring countries, the prize they could win from such talks would be not only peace for their respective peoples – the Iranians and Iraqis, both of whom have suffered great losses – but in general an end to the present explosive situation in the Persian Gulf where the conflict constantly threatens to become even more acute and wide-spread.

I should like to believe that realism and common sense will prevail over ambition and irreconcilability (and not only in Afghanistan), that ways will be found for resolving internal problems in the interests of the whole Afghan people, and not just separate sections. I should also like to believe that this fine example will provide the impetus for resolving other regional problems with the help of the United Nations. But why wait? The Geneva agreements are in themselves a good sign, an impetus for unblocking the different crisis situations on our planet.

Photo by the Bakhtar news agency

Thrashing out the mandate

Colonel VLADIMIR NAZARENKO, Cand. (Military Science)

The Vienna meeting of the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has resumed after a brief intermission. Since February 1987, 23 countries (seven Warsaw Treaty and 16 NATO countries) have been holding consultations in the framework of the meeting to draw up a mandate for the negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals.

More than 50 sessions of the group of 23 have already been held in the Palace of the Duke of Liechtenstein (another round of the consultations began on April 20), but the mandate in full volume has not yet been produced, even though there is a mutual obligation to start the negotiations this year.

The pace of the work over the past year has not been fast enough, as there still exist several serious differences on a number of important aspects of the mandate. The time factor is clearly assuming special importance. That is why the communiqué of a regular meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Organization held on March 29-30 in Sofia emphasized that "the countries represented at the meeting declare for the intensification of the work of the Vienna meeting in every direction including, naturally, the consultations of the group of 23."

So, prior to the opening of the negotiations the participants should reach complete understanding on all the main sections and elements of the mandate, namely the goal and subject of the talks.

The goal of the talks has been agreed upon and framed as follows: the consolidation of stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional forces equipped with conventional weapons at reduced levels, the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and, as a matter of priority, the elimination of the capability for launching a suprise attack and initiating large-scale offensive action... Every participating country assumes the commitment to contribute to the realization of these aims by taking such militarily essential steps as the reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments, establishing equal ceilings, etc. The parties agreed that regional differentiation should be taken into account and that the consolidation of security should be promoted in stages without damaging the security of each of the participating countries.

The subject of the negotiations is the key element of the mandate. It is no accident that the debate concerning it is particularly keen. The point is that conventional and nuclear armaments can use the same delivery vehicles. Thus, tactical missiles can be tipped with either conventional or nuclear warheads. Large-calibre artillery can use conventional shells or nuclear charges. Tactical strike aviation can carry both conventional and nuclear bombs. That is why these systems are called dual-capability systems. They form the core of the surprise attack potential in the arsenal of the most up-to-date armaments, at least in Europe. It is not for nothing that they are classed with the most dangerous destabilizing kinds of weapon.

It would seem that the need for the reduction of dual-capability weapon systems is apparent. But representatives of NATO countries have not agreed to include that term in the definition of the subject of the talks, while assuring socialist countries of their readiness to consider all conventional armaments regardless of their possible additional properties.



Disbalances as NATO sees them – in terms of tanks only...

From Frankfurter Allgemeine (F.R.G.)

The vagueness of wording in so important a matter won't do. What is needed is a mandate without imprecise provisions, so that it will not make it possible to place whole classes of conventional armaments outside the framework of the negotiations and subsequent cuts under the pretext of their being simultaneously conventional and nuclear. This is why placing strike armaments outside the framework of the talks would mean deviating from the purpose of the talks.

It is not our fault that the West cannot bring itself to discard the concept of "nuclear deterrence" and of the strategy of "flexible response," which are based on nuclear armaments. NATO reasons that the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles means the removal of one of the most important components of the NATO triad. The elimination of tactical nuclear arms would make a "flexible response" impossible, so a revision of the bloc's strategy would be required. Moreover, the removal of a "nuclear buffer" between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization would actually make Europe nuclear weapon-free. This is what NATO leaders fear, as they are still guided by old thinking in dealing with problems of disarmament. It is no fortuity that the head of the U.S. delegation at the Vienna meeting, ambassador Stephan Ledogar, said that the Washington Treaty was the limit to how far the NATO countries were prepared to go in the area of nuclear disarmament in Europe.

Guided by a realistic logic in solving disputed issues, early this year the U.S.S.R. proposed a new way of solving the problem of tactical weapons. It suggested that only the question of dual-capability vehicles – tactical missiles, tactical-strike aviation and large-calibre guns – be discussed at the coming talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, while the nuclear components of these systems (nuclear warheads, aerial bombs, shells) be the subject of negotiations in the future, without putting them off for too long.

Regrettably, our partners in the talks have not shown due appreciation of the step taken by the Warsaw Treaty countries in meeting them halfway. Refusing to envisage the "third zero," they de-

cared at the March session of the NATO Council that they will neither make nor accept proposals which would involve an erosion of the Allies' nuclear deterrence capability. To slam, shut and lock the door to a nuclear weapon-free world remains their credo for the foreseeable future.

Therefore at the Vienna meeting the representatives of the NATO countries are manoeuvring to create the impression that they are searching for some new departures, while in fact not proposing anything constructive. They are trying to prove that the lowering of the level of military confrontation in Europe depends largely on the increase in the rate of emigration. The artificial linkage of questions from different "baskets" does nothing to promote the successful and timely conclusion of the European forum.

It is to be hoped that the assurances of the representatives of NATO at the consultations of the group of 23 that they will soon propose an "alternative" wording acceptable to both sides is not just another tactical manoeuvre. It is not the wording that matters, but making dual-capability systems a subject of the negotiations.

As regards **the geographical area,** it includes, as we know, the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The question of applying the negotiations to the territory of Turkey and Soviet Transcaucasia now presents the biggest difficulty. A greater part of the territory and armed forces of Turkey, a NATO member, are in Asia. But they should be taken into consideration in the overall balance of military potentials. Such is the stance of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

However controversial this issue might be, the sides believe that it may well be resolved.

As regards **the principles for the proposed talks,** the Warsaw Treaty countries have suggested their being framed as follows: "The negotiations will be conducted and agreed-upon measures will be taken on the basis of the equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security of all participating countries, and in a way to precluding the possibility of circumventing the arrangements by means of compensating measures or any other actions incompatible with the aims of the talks. In this connection, the reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments of the participating countries will be accompanied by a corresponding lowering of military expenditures."

Confidence building, greater openness and predictability in the military sphere would be promoted by the implementation of the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty countries to hold consultations between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO in order to compare the military doctrines of the two alliances and ensure that they are based solely on defensive principles.

NATO representatives say they favour the lowering of levels of confrontation in the area of conventional armaments and the strengthening of stability and security in Europe. They agree that asymmetries that give rise to concern should be eliminated in the process of reductions. Actually, however, they are using various pretexts to avoid applying the principle of reciprocity to arms cuts and the elimination of disparities. They object to the principles of negotiation being made part of the mandate.

The question naturally arises if the Western countries are not striving to ensure a reduction in only those armaments in which the Warsaw Treaty countries have an edge, while avoiding the elimination of imbalances in those areas where NATO has preponderance. "If so, their intentions are clearly unrealistic. The security of Europe should be sought through bringing the military potentials of the sides to the lowest possible level as regards sufficiency and non-offensive defence, and eliminating asymmetries by reductions in the forces and armaments of those who have superiority."

These aims would be promoted by the exchange of the data on armed forces and conventional armaments of the member countries of the two alliances as a whole and of each of the countries, as well as districts in Europe. In the address of the Sofia meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers, the proposal for the exchange of data was endorsed by all the participants in the meeting. But the NATO countries have not yet responded to it appropriately. And it is precisely this kind of openness that they have been calling for over many years.

Control and verification. The socialist countries are of the opinion that it is expedient to use both national technical facilities and international procedure, including compulsory on-site inspections. As far as large-scale reductions in armed forces and armaments are concerned, it is only comprehensive verification that can ensure that the partners do not deceive each other and hoard armaments circumventing the agreements. In other words, control should reliably make each participating country confident that the commitments assumed are being observed. Verification should of course also apply to the troops and armaments to remain after the reductions. Such is the stance of the Warsaw Treaty countries on the matter.

To implement verification, the sides should exchange detailed data related to the subject of the negotiations that will make it possible to establish asymmetries in armaments and troops.

Analyzing the results of the work done at the consultations of the group of 23 with due consideration of the state of affairs at the Vienna meeting as a whole, it can be said that the forum is on the threshold of making decisions that will ensure the further consolidation of security and cooperation in Europe. It is time to start effective negotiations on a real reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals.

PRIVATE OPINION

Colonel-General NIKOLAI CHERVOV
Department Chief, General Staff of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces

I think the recent seminar of representatives of the Soviet and West German public, co-sponsored by the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation and the Ebert Foundation to discuss European stability, was a major event.

The SPD representatives with whom I had the opportunity to talk justly observed that the Soviet Union was far ahead of the NATO countries in peace initiatives. I was delighted to see that SPD experts, including Bundestag deputies and Soviet specialists, agreed on their positive assessment of the concept of reasonable sufficiency. Our guests said they would like Soviet and West German experts to meet to discuss not only this concept, but also the reduction of armed forces to minimal levels and their reorganization so as to deprive the blocs of opportunities for undertaking major offensive operations.

The Social Democrats are energetically upholding their views at home. Though not the ruling party, the SPD exerts great influence on the government and the Bundestag and on moulding public opinion. That is certainly important.

Facing the East

without turning our back on the West

A national committee for Asian-Pacific economic cooperation has been formed in the Soviet Union

Below, Academician EVGENY PRIMAKOV, chairman of the newly formed committee and director of the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economics and International Relations, is interviewed by New Times.

What lies behind the establishment of a committee for cooperation with countries in the Asian-Pacific region? We do not have similar organizations for economic relations with other continents or regions.

The founders of the committee took several factors into consideration. The Pacific is rapidly becoming an important international economic centre. Today it accounts for about 60 per cent of the world's industrial output and over a third of world trade. Japan holds second place, after the United States, in industrial output. The economic, scientific and technological importance of the Pacific coast of the United States, especially California, is also considerable.

In the 1970s, rapid economic progress was made by South Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong and Singapore, known today as the "new industrial nations." Their annual growth rates vary from six to ten per cent, China and the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations are now embarking on the course of accelerated industrialization. A high economic level has been achieved by Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It is important to note that the economic development of the Asian and Pacific nations is determined in large measure by the rapid growth of their foreign economic and commercial ties.

Unfortunately, the Asian-Pacific part of the Soviet Union cannot yet boast of sufficiently rapid, technologically-based economic development on a comparable scale. We are, understandably, very interested in accelerating its economic progress. The Soviet Union is a great Pacific power, but so far this has been mainly due to its geographical position, not to effective economic growth or deep involvement in the international divison of labour that is taking shape in the Pacific region. The economic problems of recent years have become especially manifest in the Soviet Far East. In the mid-1980s the products of Far Eastern industry, especially raw materials, accounted for just over three per cent of Soviet export. Such a state of affairs is obviously unsatisfactory.

A long-term progarmme for the comprehensive expansion of productive forces in the Far Eastern economic region was adopted almost a year ago. Given the effective implementation of the programme, the Far East will be developing faster than the national average.

It is still too early to judge what impulse the programme has given to the rapid economic and social progress of the Soviet Far East. It can be stated, however, that the foreign economic aspect of the development of the region's productive forces has not been sufficiently broadly elaborated and that the programme does not put forward the comprehensive approach to the expansion of foreign economic ties that is so essential for this purpose.

Methods of establishing new, non-traditional forms of economic, scientific and technical cooperation with neighbouring Asian and Pacific countries have not been properly thought out. Departmental, regional and territorial barriers are still making themselves felt in the proposals for the expansion of contacts with foreign partners. This could seriously impair efforts to expand coastal and frontier trade and organize joint ventures. However, there is no optimal combination of foreign trade and producer cooperation with neighbouring countries.

In his Vladivostok speech, Mikhail Gorbachev set the goal of turning the Soviet Maritime Territory, the Far East, into a highly advanced economic complex. He also stressed that the region should be drawn into the system of the national and international division of labour.

From this follows one of the major concrete tasks of the Soviet national committee for Asian-Pacific economic cooperation. Relying on the programme for the comprehensive development of the Soviet Far East, it should think out possible ways of integrating the region into the international division of labour and Asian-Pacific economic ties. Moreover, the committee should actively help implement proposals. While remaining a component of the Soviet national economic complex, the Far East could, I believe, be granted relative autonomy to participate in the regional division of labour. Favourable conditions for this could be provided by opening up the Far East to broad international cooperation.

Do you mean the creation of free economic zones?

It is necessary, first of all, to open up the Far East for visits and international contacts. As for free economic zones, this idea should not be dismissed outright in the search for new forms of cooperation. It should be given serious consideration.

The restructuring of our economic mechanism, and of foreign economic activity in particular, creates favourable opportunities for the Soviet Far East to expand its economic ties on a wide scale. The increasing economic autonomy of enterprises, their right to establish direct ties with foreign partners and form joint ventures, and broader initiative on the part of local govern-

ment bodies must be used to intensify foreign economic contacts and trade and promote cooperation with all countries in the Pacific region – socialist, developing, and industrialized capitalist.

We must, of course, find an optimal combination of central administration with the increased role of local government and economic bodies in economic affairs. In other words, we will have to improve this mechanism so that it stimulates as far as possible the economic and social progress of the Soviet Far East.



Nakhodka's Vostochny Port is the main seaport in the Soviet Far East.

In what way can the newly formed committee accelerate this process?

It will be the committee's responsibility to direct and coordinate efforts to step the Soviet Union's foreign economic contacts in the vast Pacific region. A feature of our committee is that it is a joint public and government institution. It was founded late in March by government, economic, foreign-economic, socio-political and research organizations.

Is it the first body of its kind in the country?

It may well be. Among its sponsors are the state planning committee, the state agro-industrial committee, the state committee for science and technology, a number of ministries, the Soviets of seven Far Eastern territories and regions (from the Chita region farther to the east), the Academy of Sciences and its institutes, including those based in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, and other institutions.

If the Soviet national committee is to function effectively, it should perhaps establish broad international contacts, both bilateral and with existing regional organizations.

That's right, and especially with the leading regional organization known as the Pacific economic cooperation conference.

What kind of organization is that?

The Pacific economic cooperation conference is a highly influential international organization whose role in regional affairs is rapidly growing. It appeared in 1980. At its fifth session in Vancouver, Canada, in 1986, the organization laid down the tasks and goals of regional economic cooperation and defined its structure. The activity of the conference is based on the principle of equal participation of three sides from each country in the Asian-Pacific region, the government, business, and the academic community. The organization's working groups and forums thoroughly study economic relations in the region, the situation in different branches and spheres of its economies, and the prospects for economic cooperation. Though the conference's decisions are not binding on the member countries, they are regarded by governments and businessmen as extremely authoritative. All member countries agree that the organization should be concerned solely with economic matters and avoid discussing political or military issues.

Thirteen countries, or rather their national committees, are today fully-fledged members of the conference. In 1986 China was admitted to the organization.

In the past, we underestimated the conference and, in general, the question of our participation in Pacific economic cooperation. It was only after Mikhail Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech, which raised the question of the Soviet Union's role in the system of Asian and Pacific states in a new way, that a Soviet representative was sent as an observer to the Vancouver session of the organization in November 1986. At the next session, to be held in Osaka, Japan, in May of this year, the Soviet Union will be granted "guest" status.

Why can't the Soviet Union become a fully-fledged member of the conference?

We shall try to join the organization. But this will not be easy and is, perhaps, a long-term prospect. The point is that decisions on the admission of new members and other fundamental issues are adopted by consensus. So far there has been no unanimity in the conference with regard to Soviet membership. However, even today we can participate actively in its working groups on, for instance, fishing, mineral raw materials, and agriculture. And we must do so.

We could benefit from the establishment of working relations or close contacts with other organizations as well: the Pacific basin economic council, the Pacific trade and development conference, and the Asian development bank.

So we are turning towards the East, aren't we?

That's right, but without turning away from the West, from Europe. We are interested in good-neighbourly relations and fruitful cooperation with all countries and regions.

A real turn to extensive businesslike partnership in the dynamically growing Asian-Pacific region could also have a political effect.

It certainly will. The entire activity of the Soviet national committee must be conducive to a stable atmosphere in the Asian-Pacific region, increase confidence in interstate relations, and promote the cause of peace.

The formation of our committee is a further indication that the question of the interaction between economic practice, science and policy is now being raised in a new way. It is yet another proof of the democratization of our economic structure with the active participation of public opinion. I'm sure that this process will help speed up our overall advance.

Interviewer
ALEXANDER USVATOV

Photo by Vladimir Zhitomirsky

The "Breakthrough": A joint effort

How to settle regional conflicts? How to avoid violence in interstate relations? What is policy in its human dimension? What is the new concept of peace? These questions are discussed below by Soviet and American experts.

They are like-minded people because they want to find, and more and more often do find, points of contact, and trust each other in the main thing – they strive for a more secure peace. They have been brought together by their joint work.

Last year a group of Soviet and American scholars put out, simultaneously in the Soviet Union and the United States, a book entitled "Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking." New Times acquainted its readers with the book in issue No. 49/87.

Several important events, in Soviet-American relations too, have taken place since then. Among them are the Washington summit and the conclusion of the INF treaty. The authors of the book met with both its American and Soviet readers.

During a recent visit by American scholars to Moscow, our magazine invited several co-authors of the "Breakthrough" to its round-table discussion. We deliberately left it to the American and Soviet co-authors to choose their representatives. Our guests were Anne Batzer, Anatoly Gromyko, William McGlashan, John Romine, Richard Roney and Patricia Stromberg.

ANNE J. BATZER, television producer and health educator. Oregon, U.S.A.

The root cause of many regional conflicts is that the basic human needs have not been provided for.

New Times. We propose several subjects, interdependent in our view, for discussion at our round table today. They are man and policy, the relationship between political, national and global interests, new thinking and breakthroughs at intellectual and interstate levels, non-use of force and regional conflicts, and the possibility of peace at a "regional level."

Man and policy

Wiliam McGlashan. What we are talking about in Beyond War, to which most of those present here belong, as a fundamental approach and new philosophy of international relations, is that it is an evolution of the human species that is required. The human race has had wars for millennia. War has always been tragic but never fatal. Now we have reached the level of technology where we can destroy ourselves. As one of the Soviet authors remarked, people and societies change only when they have to. So the question is: can the human race change its thinking now that it has to in order to avoid annihilation? In Beyond War we are not just talking about ending nuclear weapons, because that is only part of the problem. We are talking about ending all war and violence, because sooner or later some regional war is going to lead, probably by mistake or accident, to the inevitable destruction of the human species.

If we want to survive we have to make changes in the way we treat the environment, in interstate relations, in our social relationships, in the family, to respect man and help the growth of every individual. The whole philosophy of the movement that we call Beyond War is in many ways very parallel to the thinking of those in the Soviet Union who advocate perestroika. The building of our future should begin with individual change, with each individual taking full responsibility for global survival. Awareness of this fact is a shock to all of us.

Anne Batzer. I would like to expand a little bit on individual change, because that is where we have started from. One of the Soviet authors said: everyone is responsible for everything. We take this idea very seriously. First of all, we are educating ourselves, then our families and neighbours. We work in the communities, showing videotapes on American-Soviet contacts and then holding a dialogue on what we have seen.

Anatoly Gromyko. What is very important, I think, is the desire of the Soviet Union and the United States to understand each other. Of course, it is rather difficult to achieve a breakthrough in understanding one's partner – what worries him in the sphere of national security and why, what are his main values in life, and so on. But the jointly written book is proof of the mutual desire to tell each other something important. When we began to write it, no one imagined what would happen at the Washington summit of two leaders. The "Breakthrough" is also a breakthrough because it is the first Soviet-American book in the social sciences to have appeared simultaneously in both countries. It is the first step of its kind in the dissemination of new thinking. The question is what to do next.

New thinking still has to be embraced by scholars, politicians and diplomats so that they can develop it in the various fields of human endeavour. Survival is threatened not only by the nuclear weapon. That is only one of the monsters.

There are also other monsters, such as economic backwardness, hunger and disease, especially in the Third World. All this brings me to the conclusion that relations not only between the nuclear powers but between North and South, East and West in general should be based on new thinking. We are, indeed, living in an interdependent world.

John Romine. I would like to talk about another aspect of the book "Breakthrough." The authors of the book travelled round the United States, speaking to Americans at all levels. Not only the ideas of the book but the fact



ANATOLY GROMYKO, director of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences Africa Institute, associate of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., a Soviet editor of "Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking"

Is it worth spending billions of dollars on a Soviet-American mission to Mars when the world is confronted with so many pressing problems?

that people were working together for a higher principle had a tremendous impact. Here is one more personal observation from this campaign. Travelling from town to town, I sensed that there is a change in the Americans, that they are open to new ideas, to the possibility of a different relationship with the Soviet Union. We Americans call it an "open mind." I have also noticed similar processes in the Soviet Union.

Conflicts without weapons?

Anne Batzer. Our book is, indeed, a breakthrough. As soon as new concepts and aims shape in our minds, we begin to think how to put them into effect. I don't think the world will ever get rid of conflicts. After all, progress is impossible without them. Together with our colleagues, we are now thinking of alternatives to violence in conflicts. It is a very difficult thing.

Richard Roney. Both the United States and the Soviet Union use military force in third countries or deliver arms to them. It will perhaps be easier to deal with regional conflicts if such a policy is ended. It is not just the question of nuclear war but of war as such that should be discussed in the context of new thinking. One country looks at the other country and says: they are willing to reduce nuclear weapons, but when difficulties arise on a regional level, they are willing to use military force. So there is going to be no way of building lasting trust and concluding lasting agreements for a long term. The only way both countries can progress in that is to conduct negotiations, make compromises, and agree not to use force. The question of non-use of military force in regional conflicts is the key to building a world without war.

Anatoly Gromyko. Politicians and diplomats should certainly make tremendous efforts to untie the knots of regional conflicts. The politicians of the Soviet Union and the United States are trying to reach mutual understanding in this field, and they have managed to achieve some progress. My opinion is that the use of force in regional conflicts should be stopped. Take Iran and Iraq. Tens of thousands of people are being killed in the senseless war. The two countries have no opportunity to develop their economies and educate their children.

Anne Batzer. The main thing is, in my opinion, to examine the root cause of a conflict, to understand what, in general, makes one think of violence. As a rule, conflicts are engendered by a situation where the basic needs of the people are not satisfied. Therefore it is necessary to begin tackling this problem in the first place, to deal with the cause, not the consequence of such a situation.

N.T. We all recognize the need to end the use of force on a regional level, and see the difficulties in the way of this. Let us examine such a situation. Two countries are fighting each other. One of them is, let us say, a friend of the Soviet Union, and the other, of the United States. Both countries apply for military aid and weapons to Moscow and Washington, respectively. What is to be done in this case? How practically do we avoid a clash if in the entire history of political relations some countries have always helped others against third countries for one or other political reason, just or unjust from someone's point of view?

Anatoly Gromyko. I think the flow of arms into the Third World, where most of the regional conflicts occur, should be stopped. The Soviet Union and the United States should return to the negotiating table to solve this problem.

WILLIAM E. McGLASHAN, executive vice-president of the Beyond War Foundation, senior editor of "Breakthrough."

It is worth looking into the concept of the world we are living in, the concept of enemies and friends.

In the late 1970s these negotiations were suspended by the American side. The sooner they are resumed and lead to positive results, the less inflammable material for regional conflicts will remain.

William McGlashan. The trouble is that more and more countries are mastering the technology of arms manufacture.

We say today: "Friends apply to us for aid." I think it's worth looking into the whole concept of the world we are living in, the concept of enemies and friends. The question is whether one country should regard another as a friend or enemy in an age where any local conflict can escalate into a world bloodshed. Or take another example. One country is polluting the air we all breathe. The old way of dividing coun-

tries into friends and enemies, of giving military aid is not just obsolete. It has no sense and is not applicable. The nations of the world have to learn to act in accordance with reality. They must figure out how to exist without resorting to violence.

Citizens of humanity

N.T. What you have just spoken of can be described as the internationalization of policy. It is one more aspect of new thinking. We are coming to realize the need for a better system of interstate relations.

JOHN S. ROMINE,
clinical professor
of neurosciences,
University of California.

I link the internationalization of policy with its human dimension.

Richard Roney. In the recent time I have studied the relationship between global and national security. They are two aspects of one and the same issue. Can we as a nation feel secure when there is no global security? Of course not. A new element has appeared in the concept of national security.

John Romine. As a neurologist, I link the internationalization of policy with its human dimension. I am interested in the evolution of the mind, the brain. Much of the problem has to do with the human mind's capacity to perceive the dimensions of a phenomenon. It is difficult for man to comprehend the destructive power of nuclear weapons. The very concept of mutual destruction is hard to understand. But suppose it has been grasped. The next step is to develop an awareness of the planet as a whole, of our interconnectedness and interrelationship.

Let us turn to biology and mathematics for comparison. There were about ten billion atoms that formed a DNA molecule. As life evolved, about ten billion molecules developed in a cell. The brain of man consists of ten billion nerve cells that form self-reflected consciousness we experience today as individuals. On the planet right now there are five billion of us. With a simple doubling to ten billion we may come to that threshold where we shall acquire a new quality, extend our identity, broaden the frontiers of our affiliation.

As we extended our identity and moved from small tribes to villages and cities and to large nations, we have divided the world into the East and the West. As that happened, we have stopped using military force within the boundaries of nations. The withering away of the use of force in interstate relations may become the highest stage of "political evolution." The extension of the frontiers of our affiliation will lead every one of us to an awareness of our affiliation to humanity as the basic form of affiliation.

William McGlashan. I think there are two trends in internationalization of the planet. One of them is the extension of intergovernment contacts. The other is a noticeable expansion of ties between citizens of different countries, the increasing number of international agreements concluded on the initiative from below. Suffice it to mention the role played by public opinion in the tackling of disarmament problems.

Some problems that previously took governments to solve are now tackled at the level of experts and even at an individual level. Academician Velikhov told us about his project of the exchange of information between schoolchildren of different countries. They will gather data on the pollution level in the air and on weather, and then these data could be exchanged globally by electronic mail, computer to computer all over the world. So, it does not have to be a government for the conclusion of one or another agreement. There must be people ready to take the responsibility and do a socially useful work. The book "Breakthrough" is a product of the efforts of people divided by state, social and cultural boundaries. The example of their cooperation shows that we need not only a strong international government – an improved United Nations – but also groups of people of like mind ready, as in our case, to work out a decision without waiting for governments to come up with it.

Work in peace as partners

N.T. We have talked about the internationalization of policy. Let us now take a look at Soviet-American relations. There are some positive developments in this field. However, relations are still fragile, unstable, and new reefs sometimes appear. Experience shows that Soviet-American coexistence is a chain of ups and downs. What Gordian knots do we have to cut? What are the most difficult aspects of Soviet-American relations? Where can breakthroughs be expected?



RICHARD T. RONEY,
contributor to "Breakthrough,"
expert in telecommunications,
California.

Our major exports to the Third World are weapons and defence technology.

Anatoly Gromyko. I would single out the disarmament process. I think it will proceed with difficulty. Too many obstacles have accumulated, and there is a lot of prejudice and mistrust. Nevertheless, unprecedented results have been achieved. The two countries have concluded the INF treaty under which two classes of nuclear weapon are to be scrapped. This instils the hope of solving other problems in the future. Sooner or later, better sooner, of course, the Soviet Union and the United States will agree on a 50 per

cent reduction in their strategic nuclear arsenals. In general, breakthroughs can be expected both at intellectual and interstate level. I wish we could witness such breakthroughs at the Moscow summit.

Richard Roney. One of the dangers awaiting us in the future is that the United States and the Soviet Union could be preoccupied solely with their relationship. We have witnessed this over the past 40 years, and till now this has probably been justified by the existence of outstanding and painful issues. It was a bad relationship, and it took a lot of time, creativity and money spent on the arms race to maintain it. Now that the relations are improving it would be better if we were preoccupied with them in a positive way. We should be preoccupied with working as partners for the solution of this or that global problem. To work as partners is, I think, a goal worthy of our peoples.

An Indian ambassador recently spoke about the perspectives of good American-Soviet relations for the Third World. When two elephants fight, he said, the smaller forms of life in the jungle tremble, and when they make love the smaller forms of life also tremble. The two countries, possessing the most powerful potential, should help others to tackle the problems accumulated over the years. The United States and the Soviet Union are responsible for many of these problems. Our major exports to the Third World are weapons and defence technology, not teachers or food, not doctors or plants for civil needs. It's time to think what we can do for the rest of the world.

Anatoly Gromyko. Mankind is expecting of the Soviet Union and the United States, perhaps as never before, a practical contribution to the welfare of the world. In this connection I would like to say a few words about the most ambitious Soviet-American project. Many of us are talking about the fantastic mission to Mars. I am not against cooperation in space, but when I read in the U.S. press that a journey to Mars will cost hundreds of billions of dollars, I pondered over the wisdom of undertaking it. Is such expenditure justified at a time when so many problems – hunger, disease and infant mortality – are awaiting urgent solution. It would perhaps be better to launch joint programmes for the solution of more vital problems. Incidentally, the money for them, as well as for space exploration, could be found through disarmament, by following the way adopted by the Soviet Union and the United States in Washington.

John Romine. One of the challenges in American-Soviet relations is a slow breaking down of negative stereotypes. Unless we do that, we are not going to be able to achieve long-term cooperation. We had periods of a warm-up in



the relationship, and then it was blown away with the wind, because, not in the last place, there was no change in the basic ways our peoples see each other. During this visit I have sensed a great deal of openness in your country. But I have also noticed subtle stereotypes. It was stated in our conversations that everyone in the Soviet Union is for peace and that this comes with the mother's milk. This is probably so. But statements of this kind are made with the implication that many in the United States are not for peace.

Anatoly Gromyko. This is probably so because you drink artificial milk.

John Romine. Unfortunately, Americans drink not only artificial milk. They describe themselves in exactly the same terms, and I know what is implied by that. We have to abandon mutual recrimination, no matter how subtle it is. It is encouraging to see the opening up of filters between the two societies, contacts at various levels, a greater flow of information, cultural and scientific exchanges. All this is indispensable in the process of developing a new vision of each other.

Anatoly Gromyko. I agree that we have only started our mutual education by meeting on a regular basis and putting out joint books. The scientific community has immense potential for new breakthroughs.

Patricia Stromberg. I would like to continue the subject and simultaneously return to the beginning of our conversation. Sometimes we relegate the responsibility for this or that decision to our government, forgetting that we are the government, and the survival of mankind depends on changes in our attitude to the world, on our individual, personal changes. Our government was instituted for the people, and I know that your government exists to make the people's life better. I think it is now especially important for us to understand that policy is not something separate from the people. We are the government, and we should take on personal responsibility for the spreading of new thinking, for changes that have matured and are necessary in the world.

N.T. Thank you for taking part in this conversation. I wish all of you success in your future work.

The round-table discussion was conducted by

GALINA SIDOROVA

Photos by Vladimir Panov

As the West sees it

YULI OLSEVICH, D. Sc. (Econ.)

Most economists in the West view the radical economic reform in the U.S.S.R. positively. But it would be no exaggeration to say that perestroika caught them unawares. As the well-known American Sovietologist Jerry Hough put it, "during the first two years of the Gorbachev regime, we have tried to deny the reality of change instead of considering how to respond to it." Now it is the Western experts themselves who have to do some changing – as early as 1987 several books and dozens of articles on the reform were published. They usually interpreted the essence of the reform incorrectly – as the beginning of a movement towards a Western-style market, with unemployment, rich and poor, spiralling prices and so on. The authoritative bourgeois magazine International management wrote in September 1987, that Western critics believed that unless Gorbachev went the whole way to introducing free market relations, the economic problems would only grow worse with the introduction of self-financing for all plants in the coming year, and would lead in the final count to total chaos. Although Western experts neither accept, nor understand the socialist content of the reform, which presupposes social security and justice, planning, full employment and the observance of other important criteria, they nevertheless do raise a number of serious practical problems.

Full frontal attack or step-by-step?

Western commentaries voice doubts about the correctness of laying the emphasis from the very beginning of perestroika on industry, and the machine-building industry in particular. Some experts fear that "implementation of the present reform package has the potential to create serious disruption in the production process in the next few years." The view is expressed that it would have been better to launch the reform to begin with in agriculture, the light and food industries and the services, and only then extend it to other branches.

This criticism fails to take into account a number of circumstances that make keeping to that order difficult, namely, the impossibility of further postponing a reform in industry, where losses are increasing and the lag behind world standards is growing, the interconnection between branches and the social vulnerability of partial reforms; and the conservatism that has come to beset agricultural management. In view of this, the approach to perestroika as a comprehensive reform conducted along a wide front is well founded.

At the same time it is essential to have a clear view of the additional difficulties that stem from such an approach. Thus, perestroika signifies a sharp increase in material incentives and the lifting of regulations on the amount of money earned by labour. Since a substantial proportion of the working people is engaged in the production of group A goods, in order to cover the increase in their monetary incomes it is essential that labour productivity in the production of group B goods should increase at a faster rate, i.e., there must be a faster accumulation of consumption funds.

The Western press also raises the question of the priorities of the reform – in what order the elements and aspects of the economic mechanism should be changed. Attention is drawn to the fact that the reform should begin with the revision of prices and the introduction of wholesale trade as prerequisites for the economic independence of plants. That, indeed, seems logical. But it should be borne in mind that the object is to revise the system of price formation on the basis of the greater economic independence of plants, and to use stricter cost-accounting to mobilize their reserves for the organization of wholesale trade.

Perestroika versus growth rates?

Western economists are convinced that perestroika is incompatible with higher growth rates. The reason they give is that when growth rates increase this will cause a shortage of resources and will limit incentive funds, making it more difficult to introduce full cost-accounting. In their opinion, fulfilment of plans for production growth is out of line with resolving the problems of modernization.

However, the experience of both the Soviet Union and other socialist countries indicates that reforms have always led to the acceleration of scientific and technical progress. The crux of the question is the source of higher growth, and the relationship between growth rates and perestroika. If higher growth rates are achieved by extensive methods, this could undermine the economic reform. But if the reform itself, the intensification of production, produces opportunities for accelerating development, these opportunities should be used (within reasonable limits).

The unexploited reserves of the national economy are still so great that accelerated development should be regarded (together with higher living standards) as one of the most important criteria for how perestroika is going, a criterion of its healthy progress.

Structural-branch strategy

It has become usual for Western commentators to describe the branch structure of the Soviet economy as typical of a developing country (and not an economically mature one). The main criteria for backwardness is the big share in the economy of heavy industry, especially the iron and steel industry, heavy machine-building, along with the mining industries, construction and agriculture, and the small share of all services industries, modern engineering, instrument-making, etc.

The branch structure of the basic assets and national product of the Soviet economy, like the scientific and technical level of both, do not on the whole correspond to the requirements of modern progress and need to be radically restructured.

The main factor responsible for such a structure was the economic mechanism

of extensive growth with its quantitative approach to planning and evaluation of results, and departmental fixing of branch proportions. The planning bodies proved in effect prisoners of departmental interests; through inertia the departments followed a policy of maintaining the same technical level of production and increasing growth at the expense of using more resources.

Hence the conclusion that draws itself: the role of the departments must be changed drastically, as must relations between the planning bodies and enterprises. That is an essential prerequisite for a flexible and dynamic production structure.

Planning versus STP?

The prevalent view in Western literature is that the perestroika in the U.S.S.R. cannot resolve the problem of accelerating scientific and technical progress (STP) if centralized management and planning are retained. The main features of modern STP are rapid changes in technology and production, complex techniques requiring a well-developed servicing network, and perhaps most importantly – a free access to information.

In the capitalist countries, a large part in accelerating STP is played by so-called venture firms, i.e., small enterprises set up quickly to develop and implement new technologies and products, with a fairly substantial risk factor. Similar enterprises are also needed in a socialist society, since existing amalgamations are, as a rule, incapable of a quick and flexible reaction, nor are they willing to take risks. "Risk" enterprises should, evidently, be set up outside departmental limits and plans, on the basis of bank credits and wholesale trade.

Equally important is a radical change in attitude towards servicing, its organization and development. From the social point of view there is little sense in producing technically complex products if servicing is not guaranteed. As for scientific, technical, economic and social information, it is necessary to reduce to a minimum all barriers to its free flow and use as quickly as possible.

Bourgeois economists believe that economic risks, the priority development of the services industry, and freedom of information run counter to Marxist ideology and genuine socialism. The intensification of the perestroika process is called upon to disprove this in practice (their theoretical groundlessness is self-evident).

The idea that centralized planning and STP cannot exist side by side continues to be widespread in bourgeois literature. This concept is fuelled by the existing contradiction between two horizons – the limited horizon of the interests of the work collective of a plant, on the one hand, and the wide horizon of the national economy as a whole, on the other. It must be admitted that the existing method of resolving this contradiction by the centralized financing of STP has proved either barely effective or even unprofitable.

This contradiction can be resolved only by creating cost-accounting conditions under which plants and amalgamations should be vitally interested in and have real opportunities of putting through both major, long-term STP measures, as well as smaller ones yielding quick results. What is needed by the national economy should be both profitable and achievable for amalgamations. A single planned technical policy should be put into effect not despite cost-accounting, but solely through cost-accounting. If a confrontation is allowed to emerge between cost-accounting and STP, then both will suffer.

Departmental responsibility or independence of enterprises?

The eminent American economist and Sovietologist, Abram Bergson, said in an interview called "The Gorbachev Revolution": "The key to the Gorbachev's reforms lies at the nexus of interactions between the enterprises and the ministries. This is the most intriguing feature of the whole programme. The enterprises are supposed to gain new autonomy, while the ministries retain ultimate responsibility and accountability. Inevitably this must generate tensions. How can the enterprise respond appropriately to financial controls, prices and related incentives, while superior agencies, the ministries, are still accountable for the results?"

The question of responsibility for contractual obligations is extremely important and is one of the key issues in any economic mechanism. A private company stakes not only its profit, but also its own and borrowed capital on meeting its contractual commitments.

In the new Soviet mechanism can economic guarantees of fulfilment of contractual obligations be created that are no less strong than the administrative responsibility of economic managers from bottom to top? Presumably in conditions of complete cost-accounting and self-management, it is harsh economic sanctions that should guarantee the fulfilment of obligations. Their lower limit should be determined by the principle that losses in incomes, of the workers at the enterprise that failed to fulfil its contractual obligations should be no less than the losses inflicted on the income of the workers at the enterprise that suffered most from the failure to receive the goods it ordered. Greater economic responsibility on the part of self-managing enterprises for contractual obligations will sharply limit the responsibility of departments and bring their powers into the framework provided by the Law on the State Enterprise.

Concentration, competition and cost efficiency

Attention is also being drawn in Western literature to the contradiction between the setting up of associations and the need for competition, which will become more acute as the transition to the new economic mechanism proceeds.

Indeed, the tasks of accelerating scientific and technical progress, and increasing efficiency and financial stability require the formation of powerful amalgamations, and greater concentration and centralization of production. But does that mean that getting rid of the bureaucratic monopoly of ministries, ensuring the independence and self-management of associations, could lead to the formation of an even stronger economic monopoly of these amalgamations? Such a turn of events would be most undesirable, as it would lead to price increases, the removal of any incentives to reduce costs, and the stalling of technical progress.

The monopoly of associations could be countered by stimulating small-scale production (individual and cooperative), the import of similar commodities, and the admission to the domestic market of certain foreign firms (primarily from the CMEA countries). But the main means is to ensure the material and legal conditions for competitiveness of amalgamations. For instance, none of them should be permitted to concentrate in their hands more than a quarter of the production of a certain type of goods. This rule should also be applied to marketing and supplies (the only exception could be joint undertakings on foreign markets).

This does not mean that competition should be uncontrolled. It should be

regulated by a system of norms, state contracts and other measures in such a way that the efforts, initiative and constructive risks taken by a work collective should be rewarded materially and morally, while lagging behind should be punished sufficiently severely, but within limits that would permit all involved to continue to compete.

Unemployment or labour shortage?

In their commentaries our opponents invariably mention that the introduction of the economic independence of enterprises would lead to the bankruptcy of unprofitable ones and, as a result, to considerable unemployment. What they fail to take into account are the conditions of reproduction that have developed in the country and which are characterized by an acute shortage of labour.

Eliminating wage levelling and offering higher wages for better work depends largely on how we cope with the labour shortage. The view that most enterprises have a surplus of labour is incorrect, because in the national economy as a whole there is a clear surplus of basic assets over available labour. The urgent need, then, is to create the economic, social and legal conditions for the quickest possible release of labour forces from those enterprises where there is indeed a surplus. So if anything "threatens" the reform, it is not the spectre of unemployment but, on the contrary, the shortage of labour, and the poorly developed system of a voluntary redistribution of it between regions and branches of the economy, as well as of professional retraining.

Among the Western commentators on perestroika, there are quite a number who are lavish with their gloomy predictions. But they are by no means consistent. Yesterday they were convinced that the entire population of the country welcomes the reforms, economic independence and all the rest, and it is only the bureaucrats who oppose it. Today they say that perestroika doesn't suit the majority of the population and is, therefore, doomed to failure. When the well-known Sovietologist Zbigniew Brzezinski was asked who opposes perestroika – veterans, bureaucrats, workers or all these groups – he replied that most of them do and for good measure, the weight of historical tradition and the institutional conservatism of the system.

Jerry Hough views the difficulties in a different light: "The biggest obstacle to the radical economic reform in the Soviet Union is not political and bureaucratic opposition, but the immense inherent difficulty of achieving the goals of reform itself. The West has not achieved the combination of steady economic growth, rapid technological development and near-absence of unemployment that Gorbachev is seeking, and Yugoslavia's effort to move towards market socialism has been far from success."



A milling and boring machine manufactured by the October Revolution Industrial Amalgamation, Minsk, for the Heinemann Co.

Western commentators, while drawing attention to a number of important but secondary difficulties and contradictions in perestroika, overlook what is for us the main problem. Namely, that the decades during which the slowing-down mechanism has operated (its main features were emphasis on extensive growth, with social requirements being met with budgetary redistribution of social produce, a pseudo-equal system of distribution and administrative management) caused profound distortions in the productive forces. The social, technological, interbranch and territorial proportions of production are such that they make it hard to introduce wholesale trade in the means of production, the setting of prices by contract, and competitiveness between enterprises – in other words, all that is essential to make the cost-accounting contract of an enterprise the driving force for better quality and greater efficiency.

This contradiction can be resolved if the economic levers of management are transformed from being a means for providing financial compensation to enterprises operating in unequal economic conditions to means that would in reality level them out and balance them on the basis of reconstruction, modernization, training workers and eliminating disproportions. This will help fill the form of cost-accounting and self-financing with a content adequate to it in conditions of a planned socialist market.

TASS photo

The leaders and the masses

Alexander Bovin

In order to achieve a breakthrough into the future, we are sorting out our past, analyzing the lessons of Stalinism, and learning to tell the bitter truth. This is not to everyone's liking. Those who object to what they call the "exaggerated attention" to the personality cult, to the negative, criminal aspects of Stalin's activity and policy, usually substantiate their stand as follows. Harping on about the repressions and placing too much emphasis on Stalin's heinous crimes, they argue, depreciates the real achievements of those times, denies the heroic efforts made by a whole generation of Soviet people, and insults the honour and dignity of the pioneers of socialism. And moreover, paying excessive attention to Stalin means ignoring the objective laws of history which manifest themselves in the activity of the classes and the masses.

Let us now try to dot the i's and cross the t's.

Criticism of the personality cult detracts nothing from the achievements that characterized the Stalin period; there is no denying the fact that the Soviet Union won second place in the world in the overall volume of production, that illiteracy was eliminated in the country, and so on. The criticism is about something else – namely, the departure from, and emasculation of, socialist ideals by Stalin in the course of our country's transformation into a great power.

Indeed, the Soviet Union **has** become a great power, a "superpower" even. The groundwork for that was laid, unquestionably, in Stalin's time, under Stalin's leadership. But it would be wrong to confine ourselves to the statement of this fact. There is another, no less substantial aspect of what one can call the anatomy of achievements. The usual practice is to enumerate **what** was done. The more that was done, the more our achievements. This is only partly true. **How** things are done also makes a great deal of difference.

The methods Stalin preferred were commands, orders, directives which left hardly any scope for independent decision making or for taking the real requirements of society into account. The achievement-gaining system which we have inherited from Stalin and which has long been regarded as the only system in line with socialism, offered the basic production links of the national economy neither any potential for self-development, nor any incentive for keeping pace with scientific and technological progress, and improving the quality of products.

We have built up a huge production potential and a multibranch national economy on the basis of the foundation laid during the early five-year periods, but we still fall far short of world standards in the economic, scientific and technological sphere. As a rule, we apply the American yardstick to ourselves. Well, lagging behind America is hardly to be much ashamed of, we've got used to that. But the trouble is that we have fallen behind Finland and Austria, Denmark and Switzerland, Sweden and many other countries **in all** the qualitative indices of economic development.

Our ill-wishers caustically refer to the Soviet Union as "Upper Volta with missiles." This hurts. We feel wounded. But whom are we to be angry with? Doesn't our own song go: "We lead the world in the field of ballet"? This backwardness of ours, which we also owe to Stalin and his methods of leadership, cannot be "balanced out" by any achievements.

The building of socialist society, i.e., of a society surpassing capitalism in the level of work efficiency and living standards, in the degree of social justice and social equality and in the extent of genuine democracy, was in the vital interests of the working people. That was why Russia followed the Bolshevik Party and its leaders. And that is also the root cause of the mass heroism, enthusiasm, and readiness to withstand any difficulties and make any sacrifices for the triumph of socialism. Millions of people believed in the new life, were eager to hasten its arrival, looked ahead into the future, and regarded the difficulties and privations that had fallen to their lot as the inevitable concomitants and consequences of the social turmoil besetting Russia.

Ours is really and truly a great history of a great nation.

Stalin deceived "his" great nation.

Great political leaders are not puppets manipulated by classes or "laws of history." If such a leader and his staff get out of their class's and party's control, gain almost absolute power and become their own masters, their activity may either accelerate, or slow down the onward march of natural historical progress, or even cause it to stray from "the course of history."

Stalin cheated the people, who believed in socialism. He concentrated not so much on promoting socialism, as on making Russia a mighty state capable of withstanding the onslaught from the outside. Some may object that "great power" interests did not contradict those of socialism. That was true in principle. We had to grow strong in order to survive. People realized that and supported Stalin's policy. However, Stalin's concept of a great power put the state above the citizen, turning the sovereign individual ito a mere "cog" in the state machine. That had nothing in common with the interests of socialism.

Neither had the interests of socialism anything in common with Stalin's personal interests in which he wiped out anyone who claimed a position equal to his own, who objected to the dictatorship of the proletariat being replaced by the dictatorship of the leader, who insisted on opinions and attitudes other than Stalin's. But time and circumstances worked for Stalin. Russia and the revolution needed a strong man. Moreover, Stalin benefited from the absence of democratic traditions, from the age-old idol-worshipping mentality of the peasant masses, which became an enormous source of reinforcement for the fast-growing working class, for the party cadre and state machinery.

That was how the socio-psychological medium was formed for the first among equals to become the first without equals. Such a transformation did take place. The most intellectually and politically mature, independent minded and active section of the party which had gone through the crucible of the revolution was crushed and eliminated.

The record of mass movement shows that it is much easier to **believe** in an ideal, to follow an infallible, wise and omnipotent leader than to grasp the scientific content of this ideal and rack one's brain over the character of relations between the leader and the masses. Faith in socialism was identified with faith in Stalin, and replaced by it.

And faith, blind faith – be it in God or communism – renders thought powerless, makes it a slave to religion, robs man of the ability to take a sober, critical view of what he believes in...

In principle, faith offers a consolation to those who are weak in spirit, although strong characters sometimes also need idols to worship. Faith in Stalin made life easier, made it possible to escape from thorny problems, and created and maintained the illusion of a triumphant march "from victory to victory." So Stalin's contemporaries, or those who considered his activity to be above criticism, resent the crumbling of their idol. I can understand them. In my opinion, belief in Stalin detracts nothing from the services of the people who blazed the trail into the socialist future. The trouble was not that they believed in Stalin, but that Stalin did not reciprocate. I repeate: he cheated the party, the nation, and the Soviet people.

It is not my ambition here to reconstruct Stalin's thoughts, emotions and motives. All the indications are that he was obsessed with power and had an insatiable lust for it, a passion for lording it over all others. In the art of the palace intrigue, Stalin attained the heights of Shakespearean theatre. His main achievement was his own self-portrait, which he moulded with his sycophants' help – the image of the "father of all the peoples," "the leading figure in all sciences"...

Creating such an image, encouraging and maintaining his cult was by no means an easy matter. Stalin coped with the task brilliantly. He had a fine sense of the situation, understood human psychology, and knew all about human passions and weaknesses.

Fear degrades man, makes him a mere instrument of someone else's will.

Hope elevates man, gives him strength and confidence, hardens him against the vicissitudes of life.

While perpetrating mass repressions and capitalizing on mass heroism, Stalin used both fear and hope for his own purposes. He betrayed and eliminated his friends, and made the "profession" of prisoner one of the most widespread. At the same time, he had his picture taken with the girl Mamlakat, lauded Stakhanov, surrounded the pilot Chkalov, the Polar explorers Papanin and Schmidt with loving care. Denigration of the "enemies of the people" and reports on new labour achievements, praise of the Yezhov terror and the flourishes of fanfares, gross violations of legality and the Stalin Constitution – such were the paradoxes of the most paradoxical period in the history of socialism

Those who make history are responsible for their actions. However, by the logic of those who appeal to the people, it is the people, the peasants, who are responsible for the horrors of collectivization. By the same logic, it is the people, the workers who are responsible for the mass repressions which turned millions of people the world over away from socialism, and from the Communist parties; and it is our people, the masses, who are responsible for the tragedy of 1941-42. Such is the inevitable conclusion suggested by the assertion that history was made by the people while Stalin acted in the name of the people.

Curiously, those who invoke the people in order to protect and whitewash Stalin somehow forget all about this "argument" when it comes to Khrushchev or Brezhnev. They have their reasons for this: what if another Nina Andreyeva turns up and says: why should we talk so much about past mistakes? Why should we exaggerate the negative consequences of stagnation? After all, the people – workers, peasants, intellectuals – ploughed the new lands, built the KamAZ and the Baikal-Amur railway, created missiles and satellites, and continued to build socialism...

The people carried on, indeed... But the point was that just as before, the people had no means of adopting decisions on the fundamental questions that determined the direction, character and rate of development. It was not the people who decided that we had already built a developed and mature socialist society. It was not the people who blocked the implementation of the decisions of the 20th Party Congress and the reform of 1965. And it was not the people who landed our economy in near-crisis.

At the level of democracy obtaining in our country, the people could not fulfil its mission as a conscious maker of history. Building the Baikal-Amur Railway and building socialism are two different things. The people could, and did build, but they had no say in what to build and how. Such is the truth.

There is another truth, too. As Hegel put it, "Great, eye-catching revolutions must be preceded by a quiet, latent revolution carried out in the spirit of the times, a revolution not readily perceived by all, hardly lending itself to observation by its contemporaries, and as hard to put into words as it is to grasp." Corruption, stealing, fraud, juggling with statistics, the growth of the "black economy," absenteeism, appalling inefficiency – all plainly visible to the naked eye – contaminated life and prevented every honest man from doing his very best. In the midst of the people, the grapes of wrath were ripening; popular discontent continued to grow, there was widespread resentment and increaisng need for change – not cosmetic, not major or minor "reshuffles at the top," but radical sweeping reforms. Perestroika was on its way.

It is not my intention here to delve deep into the philosophy of history, to set forth the Marxist concept of the role the masses have to play in history. I shall leave this to philosophers and historians. But it goes against the grain to blame the people for the excesses that have accompanied the history of socialism – excesses which have distorted and perverted the essence of socialism itself.

In this connection, some may recall the old adage which goes that every nation gets the government it deserves. This is true in only one case – namely, in the case of a democracy. Perestroika offers us a historic chance for democratization.

Just how we use this chance will show what we deserve.

Radical economic reform – a top priority

Rudolf Rohlicek, first deputy chairman of the Czechoslovak government

The 17th Communist Party Congress and the recent plenums of the Central Committee, especially the plenums held in December 1987 and April 1988, have set a course for carrying out sweeping reforms in the country. The aim is to readjust the economic mechanism, radically improve the forms and methods of economic management, extend the frontiers of socialist democracy and guarantee a high quality of life and social security. The main "battlefield" today is the economy. Fundamental changes in this sphere will go a long way towards achieving the goals set in all other spheres.

Reforms past and present

Economic reforms have been undertaken in Czechoslovakia several times. The building of a socialist society is inseparably linked with the search for the most effective methods of using and expanding the economic potential of the country and its people's creative energy. It has to be stated, however, that previous reforms did not bring the results originally expected of them. One of the reasons is evidently that the methods of economic management did not answer the immediate and long-range goals of economic growth.

The current reform takes past mistakes into account. It reflects Czechoslovakia's own experience, the practice of other socialist countries, and the experience of the Soviet Communists, who at their 27th Congress, were the first to advance the goal of reform and are consistently tackling it in all directions. This experience must be creatively studied and understood.

This is not the blind imitation or adoption of this or that initiative. We are proceeding from the conditions obtaining in Czechoslovakia, the needs of our people and the possibilities created by the relatively high level of industrialization, high productivity in agriculture, the wide network of production and marketing cooperatives, and our specific political system, where the National Front consists of the Communist and four other political parties, and public organizations.

All this was taken into account in the guidelines for the comprehensive restructuring of the economic mechanism. The guidelines, approved by the government, set the tasks and goals and the intermediate and final deadlines for carrying out the reforms in all sectors, so that a new economic mechanism can come fully into force as from January 1, 1991, when the ninth five-year plan begins.

It will indeed be a new mechanism. The existing system of management can neither be improved or updated. It no longer meets the needs of economic growth and sometimes even impedes it. What is necessary, therefore, is the all-out restructuring of the economic mechanism as a whole, not partial measures, even when carried out with the best intentions, say, an adjustment in wages or a reduction in administative personnel.

Economic levers and the plan

In the process of readjustment, the administrative methods of management now predominant in the economy will give way to economic methods. Prerequisites are being created to make each worker, collective, factory and industry interested in achieving the best possible results in production and management. At the centre of the new economic mechanism will be the plant as an independent economic unit run on a paying basis.

The independence of a given plant will not, however, mean a departure from the planned economy. We are not going to waive the basic principle of development of the socialist economy, though fulfilment of a plan will be achieved with the aid of other levers. The government will continue to set targets in the fields of defence and security, where the implementation of international agreements, priority development trends, the satisfaction of certain requirements of the people, or the distribution of scarce raw materials are concerned. However, the greater part of the capacities of plants will be used to fulfil their agreements with consumers.

A more active role is assigned to such economic instruments as prices, taxes, terms of credit and wage rates. All this will economically impel production units in drawing up their plans, to take the interests of the population into account and, on the broader plane, help establish a balance between supply and demand, and prevent manufacturers from dictating their terms to the market.

To make these instruments effective, we have to carry out fundamental reforms in the management and structure of the economy, draw up the appropriate legal provisions and introduce them in legislation, and work out new regulations in currency, tax and credit policies and new principles for the payment of labour. Suffice it to say that, in addition to the drafts of laws on socialist enterprise and on agricultural, producers', consumer and housing cooperatives already submitted for nationwide discussion, the government will have to elaborate drafts of about 40 other legislative acts.

Of course, with the transition to economic methods of management, the administrative structure will change too. At its April session the Federal Assembly passed a law under which the ministry of metallurgy, machine building and electrical engineering has been set up instead of the former three federal ministries – metallurgy and heavy engineering, general engineering, and electrotechnical industry. As a result, a new – machine building and electrical engineering – complex will be added to the fuel and power and agricultural complexes already existing in the republic.

The ministries of transport and communications have been integrated, setting up the ministry of transport and communications. It is also expected that personnel at government offices will be reduced, intermediate links of various kinds abolished, and a two-tier system of administration introduced, that is, self-supporting plants, trade organizations and research institutes will be subordinated directly to the ministries concerned.

The role of pricing policy

Pricing policy has a very important part to play in the economic reform. In many cases current wholesale prices conform neither to the rigid internationally accepted standards of expenditure needed for the manufacture of this or that product, nor to the possibility of selling it on world markets. For that reason the entire system of wholesale and purchase prices is to be cardinally revised in the republic by January 1, 1989. The new prices will reflect real production costs more objectively.

The planned changes are to become merely the first step in carrying out the government's long-term programme for updating wholesale and purchase prices. As this programme is implemented, home market prices will be brought closer to world market ones. The state will continue to keep price formation under control and set planned prices for basic products and raw materials. But as the role of economic factors increases, state intervention in price formation will diminish.

It should be pointed out, however, that at present there is no intention to revise retail prices.

Advanced training for economic executives

The extension of the rights of plants and new methods of economic management call for personnel to work in the new conditions. A system of advanced training of economic executives was introduced in the republic last year. In the course of study, deputy ministers, heads of departments in ministries, director-generals and their deputies, and factory managers are acquainted with the general principles of the new management system and its elements and determine their place and role in this system.

Such training is extremely important, especially at the initial stage of the economic reform. Nevertheless, it does not seem to be the main or the only way.

Operation on a profit-and-loss basis and self-financing place a production unit in very rigid economic conditions. A plant becomes materially responsible if its products do not find a market. Losses will reduce the wages of personnel and restrict the possibilities for economic and social development. This may happen as a result of high production costs, low product quality, the unrealistic choice of partners and forms of foreign economic activity, and failure to fulfil contracts.

A qualitatively high level of party guidance, broad democracy, the election of executives and their accountability to work collectives, will certainly ensure the best selection of economic managers and the promotion to these posts of talented organizers, politically mature, enterprising, vigorous, bold and responsible people.

Initial experience

As has been said above, the new economic mechanism will start operating in full volume at the beginning of the new five-year plan period. However, many elements of it have been undergoing thorough testing for over a year in the course of a comprehensive experiment aimed at enhancing the independence and responsibility of economic organizations. Last year 13 production amalgamations and 9 self-supporting production units took part in the experiment. Today it has embraced roughly a quarter of all the plants and production amalgamations directly subordinate to central bodies, and a number of trade organizations.

Of course, when the organizations involved in the experiment find themselves in two systems of economic management, facing the demands and terms of the old and new economic models, clear results are impossible to get. Nevertheless, initial experience shows that at the enterprises operating in the new way the activity and initiative of the personnel and their responsibility for quality and fulfilment of contracts have increased, as have their interest in the final results. The personnel want to get rid of such chronic malaises as wage levelling, stocks of raw materials in excess of the plan, redundant jobs and high production costs.

The economic reform envisages the wider introduction of payment according to work done, and the employment of released labour in trade and services, where manpower is lacking.

I want to stress that we intend to carry out the reform in a way that will not create unemployment or lower living standards but, on the contrary, raise the quality of life and improve our social security.

Prague

The message and impact of the media

Soviet TV programmes as seen in Poland

From our own correspondent
RUDOLF BORECKI

One of my purposes in writing this is to remind the reader of an undeservedly half-forgotten date which should by rights be regarded as a landmark in the history of our science and engineering. Exactly eighty years ago Boris Lvovich Rosing, a St. Petersburg physics professor, developed the world's first electronic television unit, which he called an "electrical telescope." Three years later he took out a patent, "Privilege No. 18076," for the first ever electronic TV set. This is certainly worth recalling, all the more so now, on the occasion of Radio Day (May 7), because television is a logical extension of radio.

Personally, I have "rediscovered" our Soviet television—suddenly, believe me—here on the banks of the Vistula. Brought over by space communication channels, Soviet TV programmes strike me as contrasting sharply with what I saw in the U.S.S.R. three years or so ago, before I came to Poland on this tour of duty.

The mirror of society

Soviet readers may get the impression that these notes are overenthusiastic. Well, there is a logic in this enthusiasm. From abroad all that is "ours" looks different, because you are much more of a patriot here and take a more general (though not simplified) view of the situation at home, without going greatly into detail.

As the French journalist and mass communications researcher Louis Merlin aptly put it back in the sixties, "Each country has the kind of television it deserves." My interpretation of this maxim is as follows: television reflects the political, economic and moral situation predominating in society at any given time. It is a mirror of this situation (a distorted mirror sometimes), and a barometer (not always accurate). In this connection the contrasts, now all too obvious, between our television of last and the beginning of this decade, and that of today assume a special meaning for me.

So what was it that came as news to me about Soviet television programmes? First and foremost, the fact that they now stimulate independent thinking. The preprogrammed "phonograph man" of the recent past, often an embarrassing sight, has now given way to a man who thinks, reflects, doubts, argues, makes his case—in short, a man emotionally wide awake, very much alive, and generating ideas right before the viewers' eyes, as our celebrated TV narrator, writer and scientist Irakly Andronnikov put it.

Television has become more intelligent, more sincere and, therefore, more authentic. There are, for instance, the analytical programmes by Lev Voznesensky, a journalist and highly competent economist who never shies from controversial discussions; the daily In the Light of Perestroika features, which are always thought-provoking; the programmes for young people once devoid of life and now bubbling with vitality... Examples abound, but all of them have one trend in common.

Not so long ago, in the seventies, people in high places used to reprimand us journalists for drawing public attention to certain problems without due authorization. "Leave it to the Party Central Committee and the government to decide which problems merit attention, and to tackle them. Your business is to publicize these decisions." The policy of perestroika and the atmosphere it engenders have changed this approach, which once doomed our journalism to sterility and reptilian apologetics. Today journalists are expected to take up all sorts of problems and suggest ways of dealing with them. The results are already in evidence. As it learns to work in the new way, television certainly goes by trial and error, now digging deep, now merely scratching the surface; now speaking aloud, now merely whispering; intense emotion alternates with comparative calm. The important thing for us is that life itself compels the small screen to reflect it in all its complexity, and that this process is as irreversible as perestroika itself.

Polish viewers were, for instance, shown a Soviet television programme on the complex dramatic history of the relations between our two countries, and what are now referred to as the

"blanks" in it. The programme was telecast twice. Incidentally, TV repeats are uncommon here: a programme must be truly extraordinary to merit a second showing. After the programme, mingling with the Poles became much easier, and our meetings, talks and discussions markedly gained in sincerity and frankness. It's all very simple really: the more trustworthy the information, the greater the mutual trust.

A two-way street

Apart from content, the manner of presentation, character, style and form of communication with the audience are of great if not crucial importance to television. No parallels are to be drawn between TV and the press, or the cinema even. In the seventies, we had to make do with 100 per cent "canned," thoroughly "preprocessed" and streamlined TV programmes. Now it's different: television not only transmits its programmes live, but also makes provisions for instant feedback. Telephones in the studio by means of which experts answer an avalanche of viewers' questions in the course of a programme is a convincing attribute of democracy which is spreading to our television as well.

And yet we can still speak only of the early signs of the small screen moving towards the epicentre of the "democratic explosions" now taking place in Soviet society and our fraternal countries. Our own record of democratization, though as yet short and tentative, is unique in its own way, but nevertheless universal, and therefore of special interest to our friends. They expect the first attempts to emerge in a genuine civic forum of perestroika, a laboratory of democratization, as it were, which would investigate, against a broad social background, both positive and negative aspects of the all-embracing process of glasnost, of the qualitatively new relationships between individuals, between citizens and the authorities, the state. I think that TV journalists have truly unlimited scope for creative quests.

Our TV journalists are judged abroad by their inventiveness, boldness and consistency. After all, in a number of its fundamental documents, such as the materials of the February (1988) Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, or the momentous editorial in Pravda, the organ of the CPSU Central Committee, the Party treats the problems of democratization and glasnost which have arisen in the course of perestroika in a much more daring and principled way than we journalists do (and this refers not only to television people). We are clearly too slow even in publicizing Party decisions expertly and in the spirit of the times, although it is actually our duty to expedite such decisions by the uncompromising dessection of various phenomena. Such is the mission of the media today—of which television is the most powerful branch—as other socialist countries see it.

Some 10 to 15 years ago, Reino Paasilinna, a television commentator, now a member of Finnish parliament, a man who not only knows our country and its language but sincerely loves it, said to me: "To think how wasteful you are! Your press and, especially, television have been running virtually idle for years. At best, they seek to preserve the status quo. By their very nature, however, they should promote the progress of society, a society that looks far into the future. Later you will have to pay a high price for this extravagance: a gap will be formed by your propaganda in the people's minds—the gap between the pseudo-reality in newspaper pages and on the small screen, and real life." A similar situation in Poland is aptly described there as the "propaganda of successes."

Today's television, as I see it, has its merits and demerits. On the one hand, it is more truthful and frank, and is seeking forms and means of expression adequate to the complex epoch we live in; on the other, it often resorts to understatements, and its reaction to certain developments is too slow or too timid...

Stereotypes die hard

Now and again, our television relapses into its old insipid clichés.

Take, for instance, the vast and important theme of the relationships between socialist countries. In TV programmes on this subject we still hear hackneyed phrases like "unbreakable friendship between nations," "the advantages of socialist economic integration," "steadily expanding all-round contacts." But besides all this, there have been and remain difficulties and contradictions, half-solved problems and problems still awaiting their solution...

Take, for instance, the image of Poland, one of the largest socialist countries. Does our small screen project it adequately, complete with all the multifarious problems involved in the socialist renovation planned by the 9th PUWP Congress back in 1981? Not at all! The fragmentary facts served up by our television are, more often than not, random or even hardly worth reporting. The complex dialectics of Poland's real progress still remain off the TV screen, although this progress, with its record of trial and errors, ups and downs, is of special importance to us, if we are to learn from the experience of friends who embarked on the course of reform seven years ago against a background of serious economic and political crisis.

Soviet television has assumed a new quality. It reflects and embodies in its programmes constructive ideas of interdependence in the modern world and brings them to foreign viewers. This is not a one-way street, but a bilateral process. Television is not just one of the perhaps most effective and universal means of showing the world ourselves and our changing way of life. The small screen is also a means of expressing our interpretation of, and attitude to, the problems and processes found outside the U.S.S.R.

There arises an entirely new situation which lends special urgency to the task of making our television programmes competitive with those of the countries they are picked up in and with the increasing quantities of foreign programmes reaching us.

Our television is an important vehicle for getting our ideology across to foreign audiences. Its impact depends on those who run it and who create the programmes. Some of them have come to work in television recently, but most are "old-timers" in need of the profound inner perestroika, the new vision and new thinking now being called for. Soviet television is also becoming a window opening ever wider on the outside world. Consequently, it largely depends on TV how the land of revolutionary perestroika, which has taken upon itself the historical responsibility without much fuss, looks to the world. Our television will largely decide the extent to which the world's millions understand us, believe us—and believe in us.

WARSAW

Newsmen and the coming summit

A row of missiles and fountain pens is the emblem of the Centre for war, peace and the news media under New York University. Edgar Cheporov, an APN correspondent, interviewed Professor ROBERT MANOFF, the Director of the Centre, at New Times' request.

The Centre paid much attention to the Soviet-American summit talks in Geneva, Reykjavik and Washington. What's the interconnection between the concepts worked out in the course of these talks and the nuclear disarmament process now in its early stages? What was it that gave the impulse to the improvement of relations between our two countries?

The nuclear regime is a system of talk. For 41 years, many of the same risks have been foreseen, the same subjects addressed, the same quandaries discussed. In many ways, the deployments that have really mattered during this time have not been those of missiles, but perceptions.

Since the 1950s, for example, it has not really been possible to speak about nuclear disarmament in the United States without being considered hopelessly naive or a "communist tool." President Jimmy Carter did mention the subject early in his term, but quickly dropped it as a serious idea. It was not until President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met at Hofdi House at the Reykjavik summit in 1986 that the idea of ridding the world of nuclear weapons again became something that heads of state could discuss, apparently seriously, without being laughed at by their own advisers.

In this respect, Reykjavik was the most important summit held by Reagan and Gorbachev, and nothing that is likely to happen at the Moscow summit this spring will be able to eclipse it. By discussing the elimination of whole classes of nuclear weapons at Reykjavik, they changed the nature of discourse about nuclear issues. And it is this discourse that has defined the realities of the nuclear era quite as much as the weapons from which it gets its name.

The INF treaty signed at the Washington summit was a first step, of course, but only a small one. It did indeed eliminate whole weapons systems from the face of the Earth, but they account for less than four per cent of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. nuclear arsenals.

An agreement on strategic weapons along the lines now being negotiated will for the first time actually eliminate strategic nuclear weapons on both sides, but will still leave at least half of these weapons in place, ready to be fired in retaliation, or in pre-emption. But compared to the state of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations only three years ago, the serious discussion of this issue represents a remarkable triumph of realism over the dangerous confrontational posturing pursued by the governments of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at that time.

The rapid progress on arms control illustrates the fact that it is primarily political will that will determine the history of the rest of the nuclear era. The military facts have not significantly changed since 1985, but the will to negotiate, on both sides, certainly has.

Have the Americans' perceptions of the Soviet Union changed in this connection? If yes, what role has the American news media played in this?

Yes, the perceptions have changed. Americans see General Secretary Gorbachev as a new kind of Soviet leader, a man who strikes them as truthful, honest, sincere, and seriously interested in avoiding nuclear conflict between the superpowers. Other Soviet leaders did not appear to the American people this way and, as a result, the American people were not prepared to allow their leaders to negotiate reductions in American power with which to resist a country they felt was threatening them.

For the last two years, most of the American news media have been reporting to the American people that General Secretary Gorbachev is a new kind of Soviet leader, committed to democratizing his country, improving the lot of its citizens, and avoiding international conflicts while continuing to safeguard the legitimate national interests of the U.S.S.R. While this American reporting has not been flawless, it is important to realize that the message has indeed gotten through, and American public opinion polls now reflect this fact. Particularly after the Washington summit, General Secretary Gorbachev is now regarded with respect, and the U.S.S.R. is now viewed with much less fear.

I want to emphasize that the American press did not intend to change the political climate or the perceptions of your country. Unlike journalists in the U.S.S.R., most American reporters believe that they have only one responsibility, and that is to report the facts. It is one of the tasks of the press critic to point out to journalists where they fail to do so, and this I do every day in the United States. But I believe that it is important to recognize that over the last two or three years American reporters in Moscow have sent back stories for the American public which have been responsible for the changed perception of your leaders and your country. As a result, American perceptions increasingly reflect the reality of the U.S.S.R. This growing realism is a powerful argument for the American belief that it is the reporter's responsibility to report facts and the people's responsibility to interpret them.

What General Secretary Gorbachev has written of international relations is also true of the journalism which reports them. It is necessary, he said, to take "a sober view of the world around us," to "fearlessly see where we are," and to "remove the ideological edge" from the reporting of interstate relations.

Today the political situation in the world and the course of the historical process depend on public opinion to a greater extent than ever. In what ways can the media contribute to the deepening of this process — specifically, at the time of the forthcoming Moscow summit?

The Moscow summit will be a time to continue this process. Hundreds, if not thousands, of

American reporters will soon be flooding into the U.S.S.R., most of them for the first time, all eager to report not only the summit but Soviet politics, society and everyday life. Many, of course, will come with preconceptions, and many of these preconceptions — even in these days of perestroika — will not be flattering to the Soviet Union. Yet even hostile reporters are capable of learning, and as reporters they want, above all, to get a good story, to earn the respect of their peers, to do a good job by the standards of the profession (which, on the whole, are reasonable ones).

Above all, they will come looking for "stories," good tales to tell their readers and viewers, and they will immediately recognize and certainly report any restrictions on their freedom to do so. As far as American journalists are concerned, the Moscow summit is the supreme test of glasnost. What reporters experience themselves and see with their own eyes in May and June will influence the reporting of the U.S.S.R. for years to come.

The governments of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could contribute still further to creating a full understanding of the matter in the common battle against the danger of war. The INF treaty contains provisions for verifications that constitute a breakthrough in establishing means to confirm that each side is observing the treaty. The fundamental principle of verifications has now been established by both nations: each side must have no important secrets from the other. It is now time for the governments of both nations to establish yet another principle: governments will have no secrets from their people. To promote this principle, which is essential to establish the popular trust in arms control, it is necessary to realize the promise of Reykjavik. The governments of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should now commit themselves to allow the press of both countries to witness every step in the verification process. All inspections of missiles sites, launchers, and elimination procedures should be witnessed by newspaper and television journalists from both sides. All reports should be open to public inspection. All verification findings must be made public.

Turning the globe with a ski stick?

ALEXANDER PUMPYANSKY

I have to make a confession: my trip to Andorra promised to be doubly exciting for I was to be a guest of SCIJ. The time has come to say what this acronym stands for.

Slalom in Andorra

At the final meal we argued how best to translate SCIJ into Russian. The Izvestia correspondents were filing a report about our meeting with the President of the International Olympic Committee, Juan Antonio Samaranch, who had flown in specially from Calgary, and they were now trying to find a suitable equivalent.

One suggestion was: The International Skiing Journalists' Club, but there were doubts as to whether readers would understand that the journalists concerned do not confine themselves to covering skiing events, but rather cover everything under the sun, and at the same time, do some skiing themselves for pleasure. Another suggestion was: The International Skiing Club for Journalists, but that might sound a little flippant, or still more pretentious. If you like skiing so much, go ahead and ski, but don't try and pass of your whims as events of major public interest.

The national SCIJ delegations are known as teams, and every morning we went out to the magnificent Pyrenees mountain slopes. Competitions were organized in three events: giant slalom, parallel slalom, and a 5-kilometre race. I clinched 56th place in giant slalom, which gave me ample grounds to marvel at the skill and ease with which my colleagues met the challenge. The Yugoslav team is formed on the basis of standings won at competitions organized by the extremely popular national SCIJ club at home.

In the afternoon we met for discussions which centred on East-West relations and the changes now under way in the U.S.S.R. Glasnost and perestroika were key words. What is perestroika? Is it just a headline, an advertisement, or a propaganda cliché? What is the reality behind it?

True to their profession, journalists were trying to get to the bottom of it. What is understood by democratization in the U.S.S.R.? Is it the same as what we mean in the West, or is it something different? What are the limits to your democratization? Who sets them and how highly placed are they? If someone has decided today that democratization is good, what are the chances that tomorrow he will not think differently? Where are the guarantees and how long will it continue?

An American lady working for the Turner CNN network had this cautionary tale to tell. Marshall D. Shulman, the well-known Sovietologist, told her that he had written a book about the U.S.S.R. and consulted his wife about an appropriate title. His wife advised him against using the word "perestroika" in the title. She felt that it would be out of date as soon as it was off the press.

Kyrill Privalov of Literaturnaya Gazeta told the American lady that she had nothing to worry about, and that perestroika was making seven-league strides in the Soviet Union. Our captain Vikenty Matveyev, Izvestia's political observer, replied to that cheerful report by saying that he would very much have liked to share the optimism of his colleague, but it was too early to say that perestroika was irreversible. It is a struggle whose scale we have yet to determine. No one can give any guarantees to the supporters of democracy. The guarantees lie in the process of democratization itself, and the deeper the roots of democracy, the more reliable they are.

The discussion was held not for the sake of scoring winning points. We acted as teams on the mountain slopes, but during the discussion we were individuals and members of one workshop bound together by shared professionalism and an affectionate skiing esprit de corps. We were interested in the real situation both as individuals and professionals.

Gilles de La Rocque and his boyscoutish idea

SCIJ is 33 years old, and the idea of setting it up belongs to the Frenchman named Gilles de La Rocque. On my way back I found him in Paris. As soon as I said the word SCIJ over the intercom, the doors were flung open. Standing in front of me was a man of rather short

stature straight and lean, and, as it turned out later, very agile. I began by asking him why he had not joined us in Andorra. He said that a fortnight ago he had injured his ankle, and he was indeed limping slightly. Gilles de La Rocque is 76.

We talked about the early and mid-1950s, when he was working for France-Soir, reviewing music and international relations, a rare combination, indeed! His newspaper sent him on missions to Berlin to cover a ministerial conference. The first thing that struck him was that journalists from the West and their opposite numbers from the East wanted to have nothing to do with each other. There was no cogent reason for this. Admittedly, the governments and countries professed different ideologies, but why should colleagues avoid each other? What could be done to help them communicate? A good idea was needed, and a good idea occurred to him.

I know what it is like up in the mountains, he told, me. Gilles de La Rocque comes from the Alpine community of Courchevel. The mountains bring people closer. Up in the mountains you are left alone with the sun, the sky, and the clouds. The scale of your relationship with the world is changed and all the unimportant things just go away. What if journalists from different countries spend some time together high up in the mountains? What if they tried to understand each other, rather than impress each other with their ideas? When I returned, Gilles de La Rocque continued, I wrote 100 letters to 10 countries. My addressees were not sports journalists, they were political and cultural analysts. I had some doubts, because I felt they might write it off as a boyscoutish venture, but I had a surprise in store. I received 60 letters supporting my idea.

Some funds had to be raised at once. At first I was helped by Pierre Lazareff, director of France-Soir, and later the Martini company contributed some money, enough to rent an Alpine hotel for five days.

That was how it all began. Skiing holidays of that kind became regular events. The idea was to give journalists every opportunity to talk and the organizer even had people from historically divided nations sharing rooms. He would pair a Frenchman off with a German, an Italian with a Yugoslav, or a Russian with an American to let them see whether they really had any scores to settle.

A grudge I no longer owe him

I must confess that throughout the early part of our conversation I thought I owed that man a grudge.

Perhaps the name de La Rocque is familiar to you as well. Colonel de La Rocque is mentioned in French history textbooks. In the 1930s he headed the militants of the Croix-de-Feu, who fought fierce battles against the Communists who, in turn, called them fascists. The man I was talking to was the colonel's son.

Did he have any memories of those days that might have influenced his own ideas? Clearly, the man I was talking to was committed to an idea. I had a scheme in my mind, according to which that idea was one of redemption through repentance, but of course I could not ask any question of so subtle a nature bluntly. I asked him whether he had seen any Soviet films lately.

You are making very good films now, so frank and humane, he replied at once. Take Tenghiz Abuladze's "Repentance": it overwhelms you with its artistic freedom and humanism. Gilles de La Rocque spoke with some emotion, his admiration was sincere and he simply did not notice my cunning scheme. Then I got down to brass tacks.

Gilles de La Rocque accepted the challenge. He invited me into a study where a huge portrait of a man in World War I military uniform hang on the wall over a writing desk. The man in the portrait conveyed the impression of power underscored by a ramrod bearing. That is my father, Gilles de La Rocque said. Before the war the world was divided sharply into Communists and anti-Communists. He was an anti-Communist because he did not like the fact that French Communists had dealings with the Communist International. But he was no fascist. He refused to collaborate with the nazis and they sent him to a camp at Itter in Austria. The nazis put him in a group which included a prominent Communist and French army officers, hoping that there would be a row. Nothing of the kind happened, the prisoners conducted themselves with great dignity. They were true patriots. When the Americans liberated the camp in 1945, Gilles' father weighed 44 kilograms. He died soon afterwards.

I realized, to my dismay, that I had imposed a stereotyped image on a distinctive personality. The magic of real art is sometimes lost on us and we often apply to an artist's specific vision of his subject an ordinary yardstick. Gilles' both brothers were airforce pilots and both were killed in action. He joined the army as a volunteer, was wounded, and escaped from the camp. "It was no heroic deed," he said, "I was just lucky enough to be able to sneak into a train unnoticed." I did not press for details.

His past, his father and family, and the war of course contributed to that delicate and subtle process whereby one's inner feelings are educated, and a mere conversation is not enough to understand how that process, quite unique to every individual, had worked for him. Perhaps I should have drawn him on the bitter prewar division of the world into Communists and anti-Communists. Perhaps it had obscured the real menace that was evolving on the sidelines in the face of which all our differences should have been forgotten. They had to be forgotten in the end, but how late that was to happen! He spoke of the solidarity of camp inmates holding different views, but was it a statement of fact, or the assertion of morality over ideology? Hindsight cannot help me now to arrive at a categorical answer to that, but I am certain that at the age of 76 that man is an idealist committed to the idea of human communication as a goal and a panacea.

His attitude to the U.S.S.R. is amazing. It is not enough to describe it as warm and sympathetic. He is a man of action, and his sentiments towards this country want an outlet in action. It is rather like a passionate young love that cannot be cooled even by inattention shown in return.

He climbed to the summit of Mt. Elbrus in the Caucasus once and to this day cannot forget the experience. In 1972 he decided to launch a project to build winter sports facilities in the Elbrus area and in Arkhyz worthy of these magnificent places. What came of it?

Gilles de La Rocque went quickly to his desk, limping slightly, and produced a sheaf of papers and files of official correspondence yellow with age. I felt I had to turn my glance away...

I must disappoint the officials in our departments whose duty it was to deal with foreigners and who negotiated with him for hours on end, encouraged him and promised him something ambiguously affirmative, but which inevitably turned into something unambiguously negative. I must disappoint those who cannot even give you a straight "no," those who have made a profession of nay-saying and hurting the feelings of people who sincerely wish us well, because they failed to arouse hostility in him or make him lose faith in the idea of communicating with us. On that particular occasion they were dealing with a man who does not give up easily. Gilles de La Rocque abandoned the post of SCIJ President fifteen years ago and in recent years he has had little to do with SCIJ activities. He spoke very kindly of those who took over from him and brought fresh blood into his project. It was in the way he spoke, rather in what he said, that I perceived that he was not quite speaking his mind. Very tactfully he said that at its conception SCIJ was a very fragile

gossamer-like combination of discussion, friendly feeling, politics and leisure. We do not want the kind of people, he said, who, faced with the Russians, would say: you and your GULAG... Nor did we need sportsmanship alone; after all skiing is only a pretext. Turned totally apolitical, the venture would have been a failure.

The boyscoutish venture conceived by the young Frenchman has survived as it was conceived for three and a half decades. Gilles de La Rocque showed me a blue book listing the names of all those who have taken part in SCIJ activities every year. Quite a few names one reads again and again, but even for those who took part only once the name of the club is a watchword for professional solidarity. I was very amused by a story about a French TV crew who, having run into some red tape in Moscow, all but lost heart, but a SCIJ connection intervened and the red tape was cut.

The idea of SCIJ brings to mind the question of the role of human relationships in a politically divided world.

Freedom of travel

There are always lots of things to be discussed at an international gathering, and in our case we had the added advantage of having skis to break the ice. At supper one evening I found myself seated next to a Dane, an economic observer. We uttered with gusto the names of the places where SCIJ events had been held before: the French and Italian Alps, Scotland, Norway, and even Utah, in the U.S., where, as eyewitnesses claim, the snow has a very special crystal quality. In a lame attempt at humour, I suggested that it might be a good idea if a SCIJ event was held in New Zealand. The Dane earnestly told me that he had been told by his son that the skiing is excellent down there.

Was he perhaps pampering the boy by giving him such royal vacations? Not at all, the Dane said. The lad decided to see the world and spent last year in Australia and New Zealand, from where he moved on to the U.S. He is capable of earning a living. In New Zealand he worked as a swimming instructor. He can take care of himself, the Dane said. He began hitchhiking in Europe at the age of 14.

That came as a surprise to me, and my parental feeling has not quite reconciled itself to what he told me to this day. But let us consider freedom of travel rather than parental attitudes. The young Dane was quite free to move through Western Europe and the entire Western world at reasonable expense.

Andorra's borders are open, but on our way there our bus was stopped, and we spent about half an hour on the border between France and Spain. The frontier guards were not interested in Britons, Norwegians or West Germans, but a Spanish guard collected the passports of Soviets, Poles and Bulgarians, looked at them carefully, and took them away. The pass on the border between France and Andorra was blocked by snow and we had to go through a pass on the border between Spain and Andorra, which led to a diplomatic conundrum; our French visas were in order, but we had not applied for visas to the Franco-Spanish co-principality of Andorra. In the end the matter was settled. Our Western colleagues needed no visas at all.

The relations between participants in SCIJ events are invariably good, but here too there was an invisible dividing line between East and West. We were not aliens there, but unlike us the Westerners were in their own element. They had met previously and their countries are similar and open to each other. They could not be so confident about us, because we come from countries different from theirs. They do not know what we are like, and that creates some potential room for doubt, or worse still, creeping suspicion and fear.

Gilles de La Rocque mentioned the stereotypes of ethnic hostility which become ingrained in the human mentality. He tried to break them up by having a Frenchman and a German share a room. Today Frenchmen do not object to German "onslaughts" and vice versa because Germans are seen nowadays promenading on the Champs Elysées, while the French turn up in large numbers in the Rhineland and Bavaria.

There is a constant international traffic of people, ideas, and goods. Capitals merge, currencies are exchanged, joint enterprises erode state borders, supply and demand are now determined by the Common Market. A Frenchman or Briton will curse an American movie shown nightly on his Japanese TV set, and drive his West German or Swedish car on a summer vacation in Spain or Greece. This does not detract from his patriotism, but he certainly becomes less of a nationalist. The frontiers of the world explored by him have expanded considerably and he feels at home anywhere in Western Europe. He has no reason to be afraid of his neighbours, who live in much the way as he does. But problems arise in encounters with a different world.

I must confess to a special affection for the term "citizen diplomacy." I keep discovering new meanings to it. I say "yes" to the vociferous diplomacy of the street versus the sound-insulated corridors of power, the common sense and healthy impatience of the people expressed in strong words and direct action versus the slow process of official politics and interminable talks in comfortable surroundings. I welcome meetings of peace campaigners indoors or outdoors, because they, too, are a form of citizen diplomacy.

But there is more to it. The communication and coexistence of nations at the level of integration attained in Western Europe today have led to an entirely new quality of classic diplomacy between them. Various trade wars still break out in Western Europe over fisheries, wine imports, or the production of steel, as the interests of manufacturers and producers clash, but today's Talleyrands, Metternichs, Bismarcks and Napoléons are largely trying to settle conflicts of that nature. There is no smell of burning or blood here.

Borders in our common home?

There is a smell of burning, however, coming from the East-West front. How is it to be stifled?

There are two schools of thought today. The key notions of one of them are a non-nuclear world, Europe as a common home, and the integrity of a divided world. That is what Moscow is proposing as part of the new thinking. The Western school is insisting on the ideological incompatibility which makes it impossible to overcome the division of the world. It is insisting on the vital need for nuclear confrontation as the guarantee of peace. Where is the way out?" "Let the East become like us. Let it open its borders to ideas and people from the West, and then all the problems will sort themselves out..."

Moscow's new ideas are seen by the vigilant watchdogs as ploys designed to mislead the liberal West and leave it defenceless in the face of Russian tanks.

For our part we tend to view statements by Western politicians as attemps to disarm us ideologically and impose capitalist values on the East.

One can discuss the motives for such mutual recrimination at length, but is it really worth our while reducing conceptual differences to the theory of malicious intent? Is it not high time positive and rational elements were discerned in the other side's point of view? We must realize that ignorance is the best nutrient medium for prejudice.

The revolutionary ideas of a non-nuclear world and a common European home can transform the life of all of mankind. They can remove the fear of a holocaust, and demobilize, demilitarize and globally unblock East-West relations. The entire political scene will change once military confrontation has given way to economic, cultural and other kinds of cooperation.

this will humanize our long-suffering planet.

Radical disarmament is the fulcrum of politics, but is it enough to turn the world?

Much has been said about a common European home, and now we must be more specific and ask ourselves what borders will be like in that home, the more so as borders in Western Europe are increasingly becoming perfunctory. One inquiring reader defined the dilemma in the query: "What will Sergeant Karatsupa be doing?"

This will require some explanation to those who have not heard of the good Sergeant. In the days of my adolescence Sergeant Karatsupa and his faithful dog were the heroes of frontier guard epics who caught legions of spies and saboteurs trying to worm their way into our country. The vigilant pair epitomized the credo of the day and it is not for me to say whether it could have been a different one.

We have come a long way since then. Many obstacles to applications for permission to go abroad have been removed. More reasonable customs regulations have been adopted and, in an unheard-of development, customs officials writing in a government newspaper have mocked the absurdity of the old rules. I would not try and draw them on where they were then, because I know the answer to that one: they were exactly where all of us were. I have no intention of throwing stones at the past: I want to think of the future proposed to the world by Soviet foreign policy, looking far ahead.

How are we to make our European home truly common?

The processes of integration in Eastern Europe have lagged far behind what has been achieved in the West. The problem cannot be reduced to border-crossing regulations, although this too must be looked into now in an unprejudiced, broad-minded, and realistic way, not according to the rule books of some of our departments, but rather with European and world practices in mind.

This has direct bearing on security, for we have arrived at the conclusion that strategic notions are not confined to weapons of war and that verification and trust are also strategic notions of key importance. This has led to sensational reports of cooperation between the Soviet and American military in devising disarmament measures, carrying out experiments at each other's nuclear test sites, and businesslike contacts between the defence ministers and chiefs of staffs of the two countries.

Here is what appears to be the latest report in the series. Inspectors are being recruited in the United States to monitor compliance with the INF treaty. They are being taught Russian and equipped for a tour of duty in the inclement Urals. The same sort of work must be in progress in the Soviet Union, but somehow we are getting no information about it. The Pentagon's staff will be augmented by 250 employees, of whom 125 will stay home and 125 will go on missions of on-site inspection, but that increase in the staff at the U.S. Defence Department is not a depressing one, for both sides need verification in equal measure.

A first step has been taken. What awaits us at the end of the road? To attain full trust and confidence we need millions rather than hundreds of eyes inspecting the way things are. We need freedom of movement, unrestricted by political considerations and officialdom. I believe that an end will only be put to the myth of a Soviet, American or any other threat when communication between nations has become direct and non-diplomatic, when anyone is free to become an ambassador, observer, or inspector for his own nation without seeking permission to do so from anyone at all, when security has become a tangible reality.

But we seem to have skied a long way from the Andorran mountain slopes...

Andorra — Moscow

INDIA

With the elections in view

THE RULING INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS PARTY (I) HAS WORKED OUT ITS STRATEGY AND THE TACTIC TO BE USED IN THE FORTHCOMING PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS.

The session of the All-India Congress Committee held at the end of April in the small town of Kamarajnagar not far from Madras can without exaggeration be ranked as one of the most important events of the country's domestic political life in the current year. This is not just because this highest governing body of the INC (I) only rarely meets — the last session was three years ago in Bombay, when the Party's centenary was celebrated. Attention was focussed on Kamarajnagar for another reason: the purpose of the current session was essentially to outline the basic contours of the ruling party's strategy and tactics for the coming general parliamentary elections. Its constitutional term expires at the end of 1989. But informed political circles do not rule out the possibility of the elections being held even earlier, at the beginning of next year. The decision rests with the leadership of the ruling party, who have not yet put their cards on the table as to when the elections will be called.

The pre-electoral programme with which the INC (I) intends to face the Indian electorate, however, is no longer a mystery to the press. Analyzing it, local observers conclude that the ruling party is going into the elections with the left-of-centre platform that has already on more than one occasion brought them victory over their political opponents.

In the economic resolution adopted at the session, the ruling party's commitment to "socialist ideals" was stressed. This means achieving social justice. To the slogan put forward by Indira Gandhi in the 1971 parliamentary elections, "garibi hatao" (down with poverty), another has today been added, "bekari hatao" (down with unemployment). To appreciate the scale of these social evils in India, I would remind the reader that, according to official data, 37 per cent of the population live below the poverty line, while the unemployment figure is in excess of 25 million. And although Rajiv Gandhi's government is implementing fairly widespread programmes to aid the destitute in town and country, create new jobs and eradicate illiteracy, these problems are of course difficult to solve.

The political resolution adopted in Kamarajnagar contains a call to resist the forces threatening India's unity and territorial integrity. The development of the events in Punjab demonstrate above all that such a danger is not inconceivable and that the emphasis placed on it is in no way determined by pre-electoral considerations. The orgy of terror perpetrated by Sikh separatists with the support of external forces has today reached an unprecedented scale. In their speeches, delegates to the session bitterly criticized the opposition, especially the bourgeois parties, for their narrow party approach to the present internal and external political problems.

It is conspicuous that for the first time in the documents of the INC (I) the term "the Rajiv Gandhi era" was used. It is described as a period of political stability stemming from broad popular support for the prime minister.

In the foreign policy resolution, it was stressed that in the international arena the present government will continue to pursue the course put into effect under Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Support was expressed for the policy of consolidating relations between India and the U.S.S.R. In this connection special mention was made of the global importance of the Delhi Declaration on the principles of a non-violent and nuclear-free world, signed by Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986.

SERGEI IRODOV

Delhi

A Dali exhibition in Moscow

Alla Gracheva

"You may like Salvador Dali or dislike him, but he is one of the rare geniuses of 20th century art, one of the striking phenomena that are landmarks in the history of the culture of all ages." So went the Catalonian Parliament's citation when awarding the artist its highest distinction, a gold medal.

The Dali exhibition at the Pushkin Museum in Moscow compares, not in scope but in significance, with the Picasso show there in the 1950s. The guardians of our artistic innocence, which gave birth merely to ignorance, obstinately pushed us away from that window on 20th century European and world art. The present exhibition is a newly opened window.

Picasso and Dali. One will discover much that is similar in the life and work of these two illustrious Spanish artists. Both attended the San Fernando Royal Academy of Fine Arts in Madrid. Both astounded all with their exceptional talent. True, Dali, who rejected every authority, was expelled from the Academy in 1923 for disobedience and incitement to rebellion.

Like Picasso, Dali went to Paris, where in 1928 he made the acquaintance of André Breton, the "father of surrealism" who was only delighted to accept him as a convert to the movement.

In 1940, with premonitions of a European holocaust, Dali the surrealist, emulating Picasso, painted his "The Face of War" nightmarish in its reality, the distorted visage of a 20th-century Medusa with human skulls in empty eye sockets.

Dali created his "Guernica" in California immediately after the U.S. A-bombs were dropped on Japan. Entitled "Atomica melancolica" it depicts against a dark background, the colour of the ash that fell on Hiroshima, a melted human head with a tiny toy bomber for features and a fluid clock streaming over it – a painterly metaphor for disintegration and terror.

In 1947 Dali sculpted a surrealist bust of Picasso, one perhaps non-too-flattering to the sitter. He also made an extremely moving request to a well-known photographer to blend half of Picasso's face and half of his own in a single portrait.

Finally, an incredible coincidence, the two painters both married Russian girls. Picasso's first wife was ballerina Olga Khokhlova, Dali's first and only love was Gala, Yelena Dyakonova, Paul Eluard's wife before they met in 1929. Dali extolled her in his legion of Gala portraits and canvasses, and from 1941 on signed all his work with the double-barrelled name of Gala-Dali.

Picasso, 23 years older than Dali, was for the impassioned Catalonian first the object of secret admiration and imitation and subsequently, his rival in a life-long contest. Dali acknowledged the precedence of his celebrated compatriot. In 1947, when asked to name the greatest of living artists, Dali said: "Picasso." However, he was only too willing to accept the reminder that he was the first and greatest of geniuses.

Dali talked tirelessly of his own genius. He acted out an endless and for this he must be given credit unforgettable spectable by enunciating the most provocative of judgements. The press willingly played up to him. "From infancy I have had the bad habit of neither considering myself to be nor behaving like an ordinary mortal... I have various vices that are inexhaustible and anarchic... I have been ordained to redeem nothing less than the Painting of the non-existence of modern art."

Dali had good reason to issue such statements, as he was fully aware of his powers. Federico Garcia Lorca, who knew him better than anyone else – when asked who his friends had been at the Student hostel in Madrid, he named Dali first – said: "With every new day I sense Dali's talent ever more strongly. He is unique: his tranquility and clarity of thought are most moving. He errs? Let him! He is alive. He seeks to create from nothing, and overexerts himself, rushing headlong again and again, such is his amazing faith and thirst!"

Dali stimulated and specially cultivated an avid interest in his own person, thus achieving what perhaps no other outstanding 20th century artist has been able to do: he induced millions to look at his surrealist painting, millions who were often outraged or amused, millions for whom art was limited to calendar pictures or candy-wrappings. Dali made modern art a mass affair, using the methods of the mass spectacle, dressing up in its garments and acting according to its laws.

Dali, the actor, the clown, the carnival figure competed with Dali the artist. As Jacques Dopagne, the French art historian, put it, his painting evolved into nothing more than an accessory to the circus magician, or, if you like, his dandyism which, with the arrogance of an "old-fashioned hidalgo," he elevated to genuine philosophy. Dali deluded the entire world, but now and again was himself dissatisfied with that: "One day when they finally analyze my creative work, they will discover that my painting is like an iceberg, of which only a tenth of its true dimensions can be seen above water."

The scale of Dali's oeuvre is stupendous, painter, engraver, set designer, author, sculptor, jeweller, scriptwriter, illustrator and librettoist – all in one – he was one of the last colossi of 20th century art.

He has always been a workaholic. "There is no such thing as a lazy genius," he loved to repeat. He mastered the latest trends in European painting. Absorbed by the efforts of Picasso, Gris, Matisse, Braque, and later Chirico and Carra, Dali learned their respective vernacular with ease, winning the right to go still further and speak for himself.

Dali loved to copy others. He persistently sought to unravel the secrets of the mastery of Raphael, Vermeer, and Velazquez. His impeccable technique, flawless drawing, superb texture and magnificent palette make him successor to a long line of painting's artistocrats.

Dali first exhibited at the student association show in Barcelona's Dalmau Gallery in 1922. He had his first one-man show there in 1925. His second show in 1927 earned him notority. Concurrently, he designed sets and costumes for Lorca's play "Mariana Pineda," having identified, in Lorca's view, its Andalusian substance. Earlier, in 1926, Lorca published in the La Revista de Occidente his "Ode to Salvador Dali."

The kaleidoscope of roles which Dali played in public could be seen as the continuation of the interminable leg-pulling, hoaxes and clowning that such gifted youngsters then as Lorca, Dali, Bunuel, Alberti and Bergamin engaged in at the Student hostel in Madrid. Where did the play-acting end and the creativity begin? Bunuel, subsequently a celebrated film director, recalled the Prado excursion undertaken by a crowd of students pretending to



Premonition of the Civil War." 1936

the American tourists: he meanwhile acted as guide, inventing as they went all sorts of fantastic stories about Goya, an escapade that later introduced his script about the great painter's life.

The youthful anti-conformism inspired the creation in 1928 of "An Andalusian Dog" which inaugurated the history of the surrealist cinema. Dali wrote the script and with Bunuel went to Paris to shoot a picture "about adolescence and death," with which, as the author of "The Secret Life of Salvador Dali" recalls, they had decided to snap their fingers in the face of refined, chic, overweening Paris. The public was shocked. Their second picture, "The Golden Age," made two years later, also caused a considerable stir.

After Dali had settled in Paris, the 1930s saw the beginning of the chapter of mature surrealism. He launched into the incredible, seeking to express the inexpressible through artistic imagery. However, a metaphor even of the most inconceivable kind often becomes a prophecy, while the absurd today becomes axiomatic tomorrow. Writing in 1922, under the heading "On Synthetism," Yevgeny Zamyatin noted: "Einstein pulled up space and time from its anchor. Hence art springing from today's reality – could it not be fantastic, dream-like?"

Dali's intrusion into the surrealist group in 1929 is compared to King Kong's appearance in Manhattan, first eccentric, then calamitous. There burst into this circle, in which André Breton laid down the law, an artist who recognized no authority, even the surrealist maitres, an artist of unpredictable behavior and creativity and, moreover, with his own "paranoico-critical method," based on psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud. Surrealism intruded into unfathomable depths of subconscious, professed spontaneity of creativity; it fascinated by virtue of its impudent slogans and calls to remake society and art. Crying: "We are rebels of the spirit! Long live the Socialist Revolution and only the Socialist Revolution!" Breton launched in 1930 a magazine called "Surrealism in the Service of the Revolution," to which Dali also contributed. The slogans remained so much hot air. The writers and artists, who had answered in all seriousness the summons of the revolutionary age and found Breton's theorizing objectionable deserted him: among them were Louis Aragon, Paul Eluard and Robert Desnos.

Breton himself expelled Dali from his surrealist group considering that he had compromised the movement. However, just as the Pope cannot be excommunicated, so the excommunicated Dali remained the most orthodox of surrealists, with every right to say: "The difference between surrealists and myself is that I am the surrealist."

He observed that those who wearied him most were those given to retelling dreams or hallucinations, while unable to evoke either the one or the other. "The eye is a wonderful organ and one must know how to use it as I do, making of it a true camera, only one that is soft and psychedelic. With its help I can take photographs not of the images of the outside world, but of the visions of my mind and thought. Anyone capable of generating them at will may ignore the dull routine of day-to-day reality and give full freedom to the paranoic magic of his hallucinations. I have never used narcotics because I am the narcotic. So take me if you wish to hallucinate."

Small wonder, Dali termed painting "the manual photography of an imagined world." His canvases are in deed reminiscent of stills from an amazing film, wherein the concrete exists cheek by jowl with the abstract and such common objects as clocks, telephones, keys, grand pianos and lockers, delineated with accentuated naturalism and photographic fidelity, enter into surprise combinations with non-existent details, thus becoming ambiguous symbols of a fantastic existence. His paintings show a world illuminated by a sharp artificial light never found in reality. "Creatures-objects" a beautiful female head and a beast's body; the face of the actress Mae West as a room whose eyes are gilt-framed pictures, lips a crimson silk settee and curls soft suspended blinds. With Dali the human body is dissected, or its parts are deformed and impaled on invented fork-crutches, symbols of impotence.

From early work presenting the disturbed world of scorched, rocky shores and the restless geometry of rooms and stairwells through the quests of the thirties and his religious obsession with Catholicism and the countless Madonnas with Gala's face in the late forties, Dali arrived at the atomic theme, wherein Life and Man are poised on the brink of disaster. "I penetrate increasingly into the mysteries of the Universe" he wrote.

The Pushkin Museum shows mainly Dali's graphic work. He took up engraving seriously rather late in the day at the age of 30. An initial experiment already proved a true gem. This was his illustration of "The Songs of Maldoror" by Loutréamont, the idol of the surrealists, published in 1934. At the Pushkin Museum the visitor will see engravings to Goethe's "Faust," to collections of the poetry of Apollinaire, Ronsard and Mao Zedong, and to the "Mythology", "Tauromachia" and "Hippy" series. Not all are of the same standard. Dali's chimaeric visions: his mutilated bodies and lovely female silhouettes with bouquets of flowers as heads, his fluid grand pianos and violins, the flaming giraffe as a living torch are all symbols from earlier painting. Dali painted his last piece in 1983. Today, overcome by illness and loneliness after Gala's death, he lives in his native town of Figueras next to the theatre-cum-museum, which has a collection of his work. After the Prado it is Spain's most-visited museum.

"Never fear perfection, as you will never achieve it," Dali once said. Along this endless road, he has travelled further than most.

A fiesta on ice

New Times special correspondent reports from the North Pole

Moscow – Pechora – Vorkuta – Sredny Island – the North Pole-28 drifting station – the North Pole. Even by air, it is not easy. But what about those skiing towards the world's highest latitude? Those who are expending the stupendous overexertion of physical and mental energies, paying with their own health, brushing aside cynical smiles and the failure to understand. At any rate, on April 25, thirteen skiers conquered that highest "mountain," the top of the earth.

"And so I ask you: 'Why go up the mountain?'" True, I put the question somewhat differently: "Isn't it too high a price to pay for conquering a summit?" I asked Dmitry Shparo. He had just emerged from an orange tent. Beneath his fur shapka with its long earflaps one could see traces of frost-bite on his sun-scorched face.

"The price?" he asked in astonishment. "What do you really mean? We're all alive, you know."

"But what about the price in terms of physical and psychological stress?"

"Do you mean the money side? If so, the expense is none too great and will, I think, be more than compensated for. Our expedition is subsidized by voluntary donations. The government is not shouldering any expense, either from our side or the Canadian side."

"I beg your pardon, Dmitry, what I meant was the purely physical angle. After all, this is really and truly a superhuman effort."

"You've got to realize," he replied, "that we're doing this quite consciously. Apart from everything else, the general human and political objectives, there is purely personal ambition. Each of us is doing it because he wants to achieve something, to test himself. As for physical privation and nervous stress, there is more than enough of that. Generally," and here Dmitry burst out laughing, "I would be hard put to say that this sort of journey is good for the hyman metabolism. Of course it isn't. Although it should be of benefit to others. After all, scientific programmes of major importance are being carried out. Take what we did this morning, for instance. In our capron tent we donated blood fo our doctor. Scientists need it because it's the blood of men who have skied a thousand kilometres. The blood has been banked and is being shipped off to Moscow for analysis in line with the Soviet-Canadian medico-biological programme whose supervisors, Dr Panin and his Canadian counterpart, are here now."

True, the scientific angle is only one aspect of the expedition. There is also the sporting and, of course, the political side.

We discussed these issues with Yuri Israel, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. State Committee for Hydrometeorology.

My first question was not a very happy one. What I asked him was: "Where do you think the experiment's main significance lies?"

"Why do you call it an experiment?" he said. "I think the expedition is of major interest from the angle of sport and science. It is, of course mostly sport. But it is bound up with research on the human organism in extreme conditions. But from my point of view the expedition's significance now goes far beyond that. It represents a major political action for peace, showing how cooperation between two countries, between two sub-Arctic states, can go in the directions that Mikhail Gorbachev noted in his Murmansk speech, what have come to be known as the Murmansk initiatives.

"In that speech he noted the options available for developing Arctic resources, conducting Arctic research and safeguarding its environment. I think this expedition is something of a stepping stone towards those objectives, and, hence, it is of great significance.

"Some people believe, and there have been views of this nature in the media," I said, "that too much is being done to assist the expedition, and that not that much of an effort is being demanded of the skiers, especially when compared with Peary and Amundsen."

"Well, the comparison is right. But does that mean not too much of a burden is involved? On the contrary, it is very great, the same I would say as that which Peary and Amundsen had to bear. As for the safeguards, today these are far greater while where the skiers themselves are concerned, nobody is forcing them to go. They are trekking through the ice voluntarily."

Christopher Holloway, a computer programmer by profession, is the tallest of the Canadian quartet. Outwardly phlegmatic, he has a very good sense of humour. When I asked him how he felt he said: "Fine. It's late evening now, and the sun's riding high in the sky, so can one feel bad?"

At that moment a Canadian newsman walked up and asked: "Chris, they've been talking of the quarrels you've had with the Soviet team."

"We did have minor clashes," Holloway said, "not because there are Soviet skiers in the expedition, but because there are so many different characters, so many different habits.

Among the many Canadians who flew in aboard their own aircraft was Canada's Minister of Power and Mining, Marcel Masse. When asked what he felt on standing at the North Pole, he exclaimed: "It's a great day for me today!"

Then came an unprecedented rally by the pillar of ice at the top of the earth. Solemn speeches were made about joint Arctic research and bilateral cooperation, about the Polar bridge thrown across from the shores of Eurasia to the shores of America. And not last, about the example the courageous builders of this bridge afforded. Then, taking each other by the hand, the scores of people, if not a full hundred present, danced a circumterrestrial round dance around that pillar of ice. Multicoloured flares were fired to burst into myriads of sparks above the Soviet and Canadian flags. A box of cakes was tossed from a plane to bounce onto the ice. Coloured smoke bombs were lit. Noise, laughter, dancing galore... A true ice festival.

"And so I ask you: 'Why go up the mountain?'...

On that sun-lit night of April 26 I got the answer, on the top of the earth's highest mountain.

VLADIMIR ZHITOMIRSKY
North Pole – Moscow



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